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INTRODUCTION 
"Within the Labor Party, he was regarded as a 
conservative but not anti-progress" 
Doug Lowe, The price of power, p.5. 
1 
Robert Cosgrove was an example of the perceived image of the 
'traditional' Labor party politician. He had a working class 
background, a government school education, and a link with 
the trade union movement. He was born in 1884, nineteen 
years before the Tasmanian branch of the ALP. His father was 
a fanner, and young Robert was educated at government run 
schools. Beginning at Campania, he later attended the Sore11, 
and Richmond State Schools, and the St Mary's Boys' School 
In Hobart.' In November 1898, he was confirmed into the 
Roman Catholic Church, an organisation in which he was to 
remain for his life-time. His confirmation card noted him as 
being Bertie Cosgrove 2 , thereby using a less formal name, 
illustrating at an early age, an element of his character which 
was evident continuously throughout his life. Cosgrove was a 
leader of the people, a fact he did not forget. His continual 
appearances at everyday events such as football matches 
lends itself to the image of a man not only elected by the 
people, but also one of them. 
As was the case with so many other members of the Labor 
movement, Cosgrove found it necessary to leave home to find 
work. In his case, this first entailed going to New Zealand in 
1906, where he gained his first work with an organised union-
the Wellington Trades Hall Counci1. 3 He then went to 
Ballarat three years later, where he worked with the Singer 
1 L.L. Robson, A history of Tasmania volume 2(Melboume, 1991), P.  431. 
2C.5/1 Cosgrove Papers. uTA 
3John Reynolds, 'Premiers and political leaders', in A century of 
responsible government 1856-1956 edited by F.C. Green(Hobart, 1956?), 
p.237. 
2 
Sewing Machine Company as a traveller. 4 The date of his 
return to Tasmania is unknown, however he was back in the 
state by 1913, by which time he was employed by Robert 
Walker and company in Murray Street, Hobart. 5 
He was first elected to parliament in 1919, but this did not 
last very long. He failed to keep his seat at the 1922 election, 
but returned in 1925, this time for six years. He was one of 
the casualties of the anti-Labor backlash when he lost his 
seat at the 1931 election, but returned in 1934, the year A.G. 
Ogilvie led the party to victory. This time he stayed for 
twenty-four years. Under Ogilvie, he was Minister for Forestry, 
Agriculture, and the Agricultural bank. When Ogilvie died 
suddenly in June 1939, Cosgrove was still a junior member of 
the cabinet. The most senior minister was Edmund Dwyer-
Gray, but he was 69 years old. The leadership battle was 
between Cosgrove and Tom D'Alton, who lost the caucus vote 
when someone changed their mind on the day of the 
election. 6 The transition period of six months was a wise 
move. Dwyer-Gray was popular with the press7 , and a change 
over period would allow Cosgrove to prepare himself for his 
new duties. In December 1939, after serving as Treasurer, he 
replaced Dwyer-Gray as Premier, who returned to the 
Treasury. 
4Robson, OD. cit. p. 237; C.5/1 Cosgrove Papers. UTA. 
5Robson, op. cit., p. 237. 
6A.G.L. Haig, 'Politics and the individual: the case of Thomas D'Alton', 
unpublished paper presented to the Centre for Tasmanian Historical 
Studies, 6 November 1992. 
7Richard Davis, Eighty years Labor 1903-83(Hobart, 1983), p. 37. 
3 
He was premier for almost nineteen years, with the exception 
of the period December 1947 to February 1948, when he stood. 
aside over charges of corruption. Upon his retirement from 
parliament, Cosgrove was knighted 8, and made a life member 
of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. 9 After he 
retired, he kept a strong interest in politics. This included an 
unsuccessful attempt in 1959, to have his daughter elected as 
a member for Denison. 10 He died in 1969. A requiem mass 
was celebrated at St Mary's Cathederal on 27 August 1969. 
Cosgrove's term as Premier of Tasmania can be remembered 
for four main reasons. First, he is the longest premier in the 
history of Tasmania, holding the position for almost nineteen 
years. Secondly, he was the premier for all but three months 
of the Second World War. It was during his premiership 
Tasmania was most likely to be invaded by the armed forces of 
another country. Thirdly, he was the first Tasmanian Premier 
to be tried before a judge and jury. He stood down as party 
leader in December 1947, on the understanding he would 
regain the position once the trial was over. He was not, 
however, the first party leader in Australia to be tried, but as 
with his Queensland counterpart of the 1920s, the charges 
were not proven. Finally, it was in Tasmania, in the latter 
part of his career, that the famous split occurred within the 
ALP. This brought about the creation of the Democratic Labor 
Party, and led to the Federal branch remaining on the 
• 
8KCMG(1959) 
9C.5/2 Cosgrove Papers. urA. 
10Davis op. cit., p. 58 
4 
Opposition benches until 1972. This last episode will not be 
investigated within this work, but being of such far reaching 
Importance, it is still worth noting. 
During the first world war, Cosgrove had been involved in the 
anti-conscription movement. 11 
The case against conscription repeated many of the 
themes of the first anti-conscription campaign: 
conscription was morally wrong-it was not right to 
force another man to give his life; compulsion was 
wanted for civil reasons rather than military-to 
suppress the workers and enforce repressive 
economic conditions. Finally, the government could 
not be trusted with such enormous power. 12 
Cosgrove had not been alone in his opposition to 
conscription. Even within the Labor party, there were those 
who opposed the idea of forcing men to fight the Central 
Powers. Along with Joe Lyons, there were also men of the 
calibre of T.J. Ryan, Premier of Queensland. Cosgrove was not 
alone amongst the Roman Catholic element in his opposition 
to conscription. Whilst Bishops such as Clune and Kelly were 
urging people to vote 'yes' at the 1916 referendum, there were 
others, most notably Archbishop Daniel Mannix, who argued 
for the 'no' case. They argued, "support for the war did not 
inevitably mean support for conscription." There were those 
within the Labor party who advocated the conscription of the 
wealth from the richer elements of Australian society on the 
basis "you should not force an individual to sacrifice his life 
when you had not forced others to sacrifice their wealth" 13 , 
11 Robson, op. cit. pp. 122-123. 
12marilyn Lake, A divided society: Tasmania during World War l(Melbourne, 
1975), pp. 122-123. 
13Ecirnund Campion, Australian Catholics(Ringwood, 1987). p.83. 
5 
an argument which recurred during world war II. This 
opposition to conscription was to lead to a distinctive anti-
Catholic outbreak in the 1920s. Protestant movements were 
created, with the basic belief it was necessary to be Protestant 
to be loyal. "Conversely, to the British Australians 
Catholicism meant disloyalty-disloyalty to the Empire." 14 
This might explain, in part, the reason why Cosgrove lost his 
seat in 1922. He was not only anti-conscription, but also a 
member of the Roman Catholic Church, thereby 'reinforcing' 
the image that all members of that church were not loyal to 
King and Empire. 
Also in 1916, Cosgrove had become a member of a Temperance 
organisation. At the referendum held at the same time as the 
1916 State election, it sought to have hotels close at 6 p.m., 
and it went well enough to gain a vote of two to one in favour 
of this move from the electors of Denison. 15 Cosgrove was not 
the first member of the Labor party to be involved in a 
temperance organisation. In the early days of the movement 
within Australia, there had been men of the ilk of G.D. Clark, 
Charles Seymour, Albert Hinchcliffe, Mat Reid, David 
Bowman, Fred Coneybeer, and Frank Lundie who advocated 
drinking non-alcoholic beverages. The difference with 
Cosgrove was that he was Roman Catholic, opposed to 
conscription, and pro-temperance. • Coneybeer was an 
Anglican, who was expelled from the party in 1917, 
Hinchcliffe was a Christian Scientist, Reid was a 
p.87. 
15Lake, op. oft, p.46. 
6 
Theosophist, and Clark was a Methodist. 16 There was one 
other person who fitted all four criteria-Edmund Dwyer-
Gray 17 , but this still only leaves the total at two people. 
Another point to come out of Cosgrove's activities within the 
temperance movement was his ability to work with people 
who had differing political outlooks. In this case, other 
members of the group were members of the Liberal party. 
These included W.H. Lee, J.C. McPhee, both of whom became 
Premier of Tasmania, W.J. Fullerton, and H.J.M. Payne. 19 
It is reasonable to expect Cosgrove's link with this 
organisation to have helped him with his attempt to enter 
parliament in 1916. There was clearly a wish, on the part of 
the electors of Denison, to have the hotels close early. This 
did not translate into votes for Cosgrove. Even when he 
succeeded in gaining a seat in 1919, it was due to a variety of 
reasons. 
His prohibitionist stand, his base in the unions, his 
reputation as a moderate in Labor politics and not 
least, his position on the ballot paper, directly 
following Cleary (who secured 1260 first-preference 
votes above the quota) all contributed to his 
success. 19 
Clearly it was not possible in the early inter-war period, for a 
new candidate to gain a seat in parliament, with only a single 
issue platform. 
16Howard Coxon, John Playford, and Robert Reid, Biographical register of 
the South Australian parliament 1857-1957(Netley. S.A., 1985); C.N. 
Connolly, Biographical register of the New South Wales parliament 1856-  
1901(Canberra, 1983). pp. 54-55; D.B. Waterson, A biographical register of 
the Queensland parliament 1860-1929(Canberra. 1972), pp. 85, 157; R. 
McMullin, The light on the hill(Melbourne, 1991), pp. 13, 18, 24, 30, 78. 
17RP. Davis, Edmund Dwyer-Gray', A.D.B., vol 12. pp. 390-91. 
18Lake, up cit., p. 46. 
19Ibid , p. 185. 
7 
At the State conference in May, he was elected to the party 
executive, the first position in his rise to high office. 20 In May 
1920, he was elected President of the Tasmanian branch of 
the ALP21 , and later that same year, he chaired a 
parliamentary committee on the Fair Rents Bill. 22 In 
December 1925, he was one of the government members on 
the joint committee on the constitution. 23 In the course of 
passing the 1924-25 budget, the Legislative ,Council did not 
wish to pass the Lyons government's budget as presented. 
Instead of accepting the upper house's amendments, the 
appropriation bill was taken to the administrator, Sir Herbert 
Nicholls, who gave it the Royal Assent being sought by the 
Premier. The outcome of the committee's meetings was an 
amendment to the Tasmanian Constitution Act, which meant 
the government could not repeat the actions of 1924. There is 
no evidence available to suggest how Cosgrove acted whilst on 
the committee, but he had only just re-entered parliament, so 
there is every reason to believe he agreed totally with the 
views of the Premier. One long-term effect of this scenario was 
the 1948 constitutional crisis. If the Lyons cabinet had won 
the conflict with the Legislative Council, it is fair to suggest 
the period following the trial of Cosgrove would have taken a 
different course. 
p. 180. 
21 R. Davis Eighty years Labor..., pp. 12, 15. 
22Robson, op.cit., p. 367. 
23Robson, op. cit. p. 402. 
8 
Throughout his life, many people made favourable remarks 
about, and to Cosgrove. In a referee report written at Dover in 
June 1903, young Robert is described as being "honest, 
trustful, and obedient, very obliging to customers." In this 
4 latter part can be seen an early recognition of the importance 
of communication with people as a whole. In the previous 
year. a reference from Lester Brothers contained the following: 
"[Cosgrove] gave us every satisfaction, we believe him to be 
thoroughly honest and trustworthy. he left our employ to 
better himself." In October 1903, the President of the Hobart 
Catholic Young Men's Society wrote Robert Cosgrove "has 
always been an energetic worker, his departure will be a great 
loss, to our Society." Similarly, William Campbell, Grocer 
and Tea Dealer, "found him ready & willing to do any kind of 
work & always very civil & attentive to customers." One report 
of note, which was given to Cosgrove, came from the Singer 
Sewing Machine Company, just before he went to New 
Zealand in December 1909. In it, the writer noted the 
company did not normally write referee reports for travellers, 
"but you can refer anyone to us and we will be pleased to give 
a favourable answer to any questions they may ask 
concerning you."24 Upon his election to the presidency of the 
Denison branch of the Workers Political League in 1913, he 
received a note from James Guy, which said in part "I trust 
your successor in the office of Secretary will have as good a 
record as you have earned, and that you may do as well in the 
chair as in command of the books." 25 Of more general note, 
24c5/ 1 Cosgrove Papers. uTA. 
25c.5/30 Cosgrove Papers. UTA. 
9 
Townsley, in his book The government of Tasmania, states 
Cosgrove was "Stolid, imperturbable, hard-working and 
always accessible". Furthermore, he "exercised considerable 
authority as Premier", and was "familiar with every aspect of 
the state of the government". 26 
26(St. Lucia, 1977), p. 101. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEFENCE OF 
TASMANIA 
"Yet there was seldom a sense of urgency let alone 
panic about the war in Tasmania. Allied 
headquarters regarded the island as an 'isolated 
locality' and undoubtedly this perception was 
widespread. Even in April 1942, when invasion of at 
least part of Australia was a distinct possibility, 
civil defence officers in Tasmania found the public 
deplorably indifferent." 
L L. Robson, A history of Tasmania vol. 2, p.504. 
10 
When war was declared in September 1939, the Australian 
people, being loyal to King, country, and empire, sent their 
young men off to fight the enemy. At first against the tyranny of 
Nazi Germany, this was .soon followed by allies of the Great 
War, Italy and Japan. At home in Australia, efforts were made 
to keep the enemy, should they try to invade this country, at 
arms length. In Tasmania, the same regulations and resolve 
were in place as in the other states. Robert Cosgrove, the war-
time Premier, obediently followed the instructions of the 
successive Prime Ministers-Menzies, Fadden, Curtin, Forde, and 
Chifley-and helped, one way or another, to obey the instructions 
coming out of Canberra. Tasmania's war effort covered many 
areas, each overlaying different elements of everyday life. 
Foremost amongst these were matters dealing with air raid 
shelters, lighting regulations, and evacuation plans. Tasmania 
also played its part in the production of munitions, largely due 
to the personal efforts of Premier Cosgrove. 
On 3 September 1939, the people of Australia found themselves 
at war with Germany. There was no need for a formal 
declaration, since the Government at Westminster had already 
performed this act.' At this stage, Robert Cosgrove was still 
Treasurer in the Dwyer-Gray Government, and was not to 
become Premier for three more months. 
'In his address to the nation, Prime Minister Menzies said Britain .had 
declared war against Germany, "and that, as a result, Australia is also at 
war". Menzies quoted in R McMullin, The light on the hill(Melbourne, 1991), 
pp.99-100. See P. Hasluck, The government and the people vol 1,(Canberra, 
1952), p.154 for the actual proclamation. 
11 
When the founding fathers of the Commonwealth met late last 
century, defence of the new Australia was given to the soon to 
be created Federal Government. Under section 51 (vi) of the 
Constitution, all matter's dealing with the Naval and Military 
Forces rest with the Government in Canberra2 . Cosgrove was 
not unlike his counterparts interstate. His was a duty of 
carrying out the plans and policies developed by the Federal 
Governments. 
When he became Premier, Cosgrove did not take direct control 
over the war effort in Tasmania, preferring to leave that to other 
people. The Civil Defence Legion (CDL), an organisation created 
by Ogilvie in February 1939, was controlled by the Minister for 
Lands and Works. 3 Even after Cosgrove took on the additional 
responsibility of Minister for Civil Defence, a study of the papers 
available shows most of the work being undertaken by its 
Director. The Premier, on two occasions, delegated all but the 
power to delegate, to its director. 4 In Cosgrove's defence, whilst 
he did not take personal control as far as writing the papers, he 
was still subject to the principle of ministerial responsibility, 
and was therefore answerable for its actions. 
The CDL was the central element of Tasmania's war effort, since 
it was responsible for the carrying out of defence policy. This 
covered such areas as shelters, lighting, and evacuation. Since 
2The founding fathers of the constitution looked to the United States of 
America and Canada for precedents. John Quick and Robert Garren,The 
annotated constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Sydney. 1901), 
p.561. 
3P.O. 43/7/39 AOT 
413 .0. 43/10/42: P.O. 43/27/43 AOT 
12 
defence policy decisions were made in Canberra, all the CDL had 
to do was to ensure the orders were carried out. 
Fr the early part of the war, the possibility of Australia being 
invaded did not greatly concern Cosgrove. Until the 'phoney 
war'5 ended in July 1940, the Australian Governments lacked 
enthusiasm. This problem arose because the war was being 
fought on the other side of the world. If it had begun in the 
Pacific region, then there would have been a greater sense of 
urgency, since the battles would have been closer to home, with 
an immediate danger of invasion. 
There had been preparation in the 1930s for an outbreak of 
hostilities. As early as 1935, plans covering the defence of 
Australia were drawn up, in case it came under attack from an 
external military force. In November, Prime Minister Lyons 
called for papers from members of the Federal Cabinet for a 
conference, to be held in Hobart in the following February. In 
response, Archdale Parkhill, the Minister of Defence, sent a 
draft paper written by the Military Board, which included "the 
protection of the civil population against the result of gas 
attacks". 6 At the conference, which took place in Adelaide in 
August 1936, an agreement was reached whereby the State 
Governments would look after "the training of the personnel of 
essential civil services", whereas the Commonwealth would look 
after the equipment, manuals, and "the services of officers to 
5 A term used by historians for the period from 3 September 1939. to the fall 
of France in July 1940. For an example of this. see Townsley Tasmania from 
colony to statehood 1803-1945(Hobart, 1991), p.412. 
6Hasluck vol 1, p.125. 
13 
instruct key personnel and technical information and advice." 7 
At another conference a similar decision was made. At the 
March 1939 meeting, the Australian Governments signed an 
agreement that said in part, they were fully aware of the need to 
complete the tasks under way for the protection of the civil 
population if there was an aerial attack. This covered the 
possibility of the enemy using gas, high explosive and incendiary 
bombs . 8 It is odd, after such early preparations, the 
governments should have been so lax when the war began. 
When hostilities finally broke out, these preparations were 
wasted. It was as if the governments had spent all their 
enthusiasm working on plans in the advent of war, so that 
when it finally arrived, they could not manage to undertake any 
further efforts. Townsley, in his book Tasmania from colony to  
statehood, suggests although there had been many years of 
preparation, when war broke out, there was not enough 
administrative machinery to undertake the tasks needed. The 
amount of money spent on defence was insufficient, despite its 
budgetary allocations from Parliament. Communication between 
the Commonwealth departments, and between the 
Commonwealth and State Governments was poor, and from the 
outset, there was too much work left to improvisation. Townsley 
concludes, the 'phoney war' allowed the Australian 
Governments time to correct the errors made to date, but it also 
7Hasluck, vol 1, p.126. 
8P.0. 43/1/41 AOT: Hasluck, vol 1, p.134. 
14 
led to laziness. 9 
The Commonwealth Government had decided not to construct 
air raid shelters in the cities, and the plan for the construction 
of a shelter under Franklin Square, as there had been ten years 
earlier, was dropped since it cost too much to build, and there 
were too many engineering difficulties in such a project. 10 This 
suggests a higher fear of war in 1930 than in 1940. In a minute 
written at the beginning of 1940, members of the State Cabinet 
were informed the lack of Commonwealth funding for air raid 
shelters. If the situation changed, the State Government did not 
want sole responsibility for their construction: whilst local 
authorities were expected to look after their own people, as 
happened in England." 
From the outbreak of the war, efforts were made to have a 
munitions factory created in Tasmania. It was not until 1940 
that one was opened, and only after considerable effort by 
Cosgrove. The government in Canberra had looked first to New 
South Wales, and then to Victoria when alloting its choices. It 
was quite logical these two states should be the first choices, 
since they the two largest areas of population, and facilities for 
the production of munitions were already in place. 
The first factory to be built in Tasmania was a munitions 
annexe next to the railway workshops in Launceston. It was 
9Townsley. Tasmania..., p.412. 
10Robert Cosgrove to W.R Peel Salisbury, Sandy Bay, 22 October 1940. P.O. 
43/118/40. ACM P.O. 43/8/40 AOT 
11 P.0. 43/8/40 AOT 
15 
built to construct Q.F. twenty-five pounder H.E. shell cases, 
with the funds coming from the Commonwealth for the 
buildings and machinery, whilst the State paid "a small 
proportion of the initial cost". It had an initial staff of about 
one hundred and thirty men, with about half of these being 
skilled operators. 12 
It had an initial cost of £10,000, the money for the construction 
of the building, to house the plant, was to be lent by the 
Commonwealth Government, subject to the acceptance by the 
State Government of certain conditions. The loan, less 
depreciation, was to be repaid within ten years; 
The Tasmanian Government [was] to erect a building to be 
approved by the Director, Gun Ammunition Production, 
as suitable for the production of not less than 150,000 
shell Q.F. 25 pdr. H.E. per annum; provision [was] to be 
made also for extension of the building for an additional 
capacity of not less than 150,000 per annum if required at 
a later date; 
the loan was to be interest free so long as the building was used 
for Commonwealth work, whether in use or idle; the 
Commonwealth was to charge a rent of four per cent on 
depreciated value for the duration of the time the State 
Government used the building; and, depreciation was to be ten 
per cent of the money lent. These conditions were accepted by 
the Cosgrove Government within three days of receipt of the 
letter from Prime Minister Menzies. 13 Within four months, the 
cost had increased to £14,000, and the extra money was lent on 
12Press Statement by Cosgrove, 22 October 1940. P.O. 43/72/40 AOT; 
Robson Vol 2, p.485. 
13Prime Minister to Cosgrove, 9 November 1940; Cosgrove to Menzies 12 
November 1940. P.O. 43/72/40 AOT. 
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the same conditions as before. 14 
A factory was also built at Derwent Park at a total cost to the 
Commonwealth Government of £942,899 15 . At its peak, in 
December 1943, it employed 1,350 people, of whom eight 
hundred and fifty were women, or sixty-three per cent of its. 
workforce. This was the rule rather than the exception. The war 
years enabled many women to enter the workforce on a full-time 
basis, and take over many of the areas seen as male orientd in 
peace-time. However, with the demobilisation of the forces, 
most, if not all of these positions reverted to male dominance. 
The production, which was outstanding, was even more 
remarkable when it is realised the employees were taken on 
without any prior experience. In its first two months, 13,855 
mortar bombs were made, reaching a peak of 96,095 in 
November-December 1943, with a total war-time effort of 618, 
298. The initial cost per bomb was five shillings, but this went 
down to a low of three shillings ten pence. In its first month, 
five thousand two inch mortar bomb tails were made, reaching a 
peak of 124,594 for the four week period ending 30 June 1944. 
With an initial cost of five shillings nine pence each this went 
down to a low price of two shillings ten pence. The production of 
twenty millimetre cases peaked at 187,636 in September 1944, 
with a total war-time production of around one million. The 
14acting Prime Minister to Cosgrove, 10 March 1941; Cosgrove to acting Prime 
Minister, 12 March 1941. P.O. 43/12/41 AOT. 
151and 	 £3,988 
annexe of thirty-seven buildings £377,911 
plant 	 £632,000 
installation of plant 	 =9.000  
Total 	 1.,942.899  
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Initial cost of five shillings each at the start of production, went 
down to a low price of two shillings three pence. Similarly, 
690,813 forty millimetre cases were produced. 16 
By 1941, the Tasmanian Government was taking the situation 
seriously. With the fall of France in May 1940, and with Britain 
seen to be on the verge of collapse, a sense of urgency entered 
the war effort. For the first time since the war began, the 
government were contemplating the need for the evacuation of 
the population should an enemy force invade Tasmania. At this 
stage in the war, the only forces who might have invaded 
Australia were the Germans and the Italians. This was unlikely, 
since there were no Italo-German activities within close 
proximity. The fear of invasion had increased enough for the 
Health Department to ensure they could evacuate the patients 
and staff at the Royal Hobart Hospital should an emergency 
arise. 17 
The physical protection of Tasmania was in the hands of the 
Volunteer Defence Corps 18 , and the three elements of the 
Australian armed forces-Army, Navy, and Air Force. With the 
defence of Australia being taken seriously, detailed plans were 
drawn up to cater for an aerial and naval invasion of Tasmania. 
In Hobart, the Ocean, Queens, and Kings piers, Franklin and 
Electrolytic-Zinc company wharves were to be destroyed by fire, 
ignited by a mixture of fuel oil and kerosene, with the latter 
16 Matt O'Brien, Tasmania's war effort(Hobart, 1946?), p.35. 
17"CIVIL DEFENCE ACTIVITIES", M, 16 January 1941. 
180'Brien, OD. Cit., p.13. 
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being supplemented by fire boats from the Navy. Elizabeth pier, 
being constructed from reinforced concrete, was to be destroyed 
by explosives. Similar actions were planned for Princes wharf, 
however owing to a lack of explosives in Tasmania, this was 
altered to sinking boats around it, in the hope their masts 
would slow down any enemy fleet. Lurgurena berth was to be left 
until the last possible moment before being destroyed by 
explosives. 19 This plan of destruction was supplemented by the 
siting of guns, giving emphasis in Hobart to four main areas:the 
land within a radius of one hundred yards from the GPO, 
covering H. Jones and Co, Anglesea Barracks, government 
offices, the hospital, and the most important business premises; 
Electrolytic-Zinc Company plant, and HEC sub-stations; the 
area between these two locations, where the majority of the 
. poorer residential houses were located; and Bridgewater bridge, 
the arterial route between Hobart and the rest of Tasmania. 20 
If Hobart was attacked, aerial bombardment was most likely to 
come from the south or east. Any attack starting from the west 
would have been hampered by the mountain. This would have 
meant the need to fly at five thousand feet, especially if the 
weather was bad, with the planes going down to two thousand 
feet to drop their bombs. Should such an episode occur, "the 
most probable attack will be from light craft with few bombs." 
Special attention was given to the Electrolytic-Zinc company, 
which was seen as the single most important element of the war 
industry, although the plant was scattered, making complete 
19S/84/11. CA. 
29S/52/35; S/54/13. CA. 
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destruction difficult. 21 
Restrictions on everyday life increased once the Japanese 
entered the war. With an enemy force so close to home, the 
possibility of invasion became realistic. As the Japanese forces 
moved closer to Australia, the fear increased, as did the 
restrictions. On the personal level, the war infringed on everyday 
life in a number of ways. One of these was lighting. Regulations 
were introduced covering the use of lights. At home they were 
covered, or extinguished; "car headlights were masked"; 
advertising was not allowed; daylight saving was introduced: 
and late night shopping, wherever it was in operation, was 
removed, causing the shops to be shut by 6pm. 22 This also 
covered patriotic events. 23 
In Tasmania, lighting control was enforced by the police and air 
raid precaution staff. Instructions were set out covering the 
procedure to be followed in the event of an air raid, and were 
tested throughout the war. Lighting use was determined by the 
Hydro-Electric Commission, which directed verbally, or in 
writing, to the Director of Civil Defence, a nominee, or the 
Commissioner of Police. In the test, the duty officer at the 
Headquarters of 6 Military District would inform the 
Commissioner of Police, the Hydro-Electric Commission, 
Director of Civil Defence, and the Premier's office. The operator 
at the main metropolitan sub-station informed the operators of 
21s/54/13. CA. 
22Paul Hasluck, The government and the people vol 2(Canberra, 1970), pp.64- 
65. 
23P.0. 43/66/41 AOT 
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public lighting in the cities and towns around the state, which 
led to a state wide black-out. 24 By 1942, Hobart could be 
blacked-out within three minutes of the order given, and it only 
took ten minutes for the entire state to be in total darkness. 25 
In the event of a raid, the people of the city or town were to 
move to a place of safety. In the interstate cities, slit trenches 
and basement shelters were available26 , but in Tasmania this 
was not the case. The Director of Civil Defence suggested the 
ground floor of buildings would be sufficiently safe. He did, - 
however, accept the view slit trenches would be fine for those 
people living in the suburbs.27 For the most part, the buildings 
within the Hobart commercial district were no more than two or 
three storeys high. There were, however, a few notable 
exceptions. Amongst these were the Kodak building in Elizabeth 
Street, the T & G building on the corner of Collins and Murray 
Streets, which is seven storeys high, and the health Department 
building on the corner of Davey and Murray Streets. 25 Whilst 
the construction of a single air raid shelter under Franklin 
Square was not possible, a series of shelters throughout the city 
would have been better than the ground floor of a two storey 
building. There were ready made buildings which might have 
served in the event of an emergency. There was the Variety 
Picture Theatre in Elizabeth Street, two dance halls-Trocadero 
24p.o. 43/42/41 AOT 
2513.0. 43/1/42 AOT 
26Hasluck vol 2, p.125. 
27P.0. 43/1/42 AOT. Slit trenches were ordered to be dug to accommodate all 
troops stationed within fifty miles of the coast. MILCOMMAND MELB to 
MILCOMMAND HOBART, 9 December 1941. S/39/86. CA. 
2830/8469: 30/5532: NS/892/54: NS/892/52. AOT. 
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opposite the G.P.O. in Elizabeth Street, and the Royale Ball 
Room in Liverpool Street; air raid shelters in Bathurst and 
Murray Streets and in Franklin Square; as well as underground 
toilets in Elizabeth.and Harrington Streets; and the Star Cafe 
In Elizabeth Street. All of these places were underground, 
although their total capacity cannot be clearly stated. 
By the beginning of 1942, there should have been six factories 
constructing munitions. The Commonwealth factory in Derwent 
Park, and the shell annexe in Launceston were producing brass 
straps, brass cartridge cases, and twenty-five pounder H.E. 
shells. However, problems had arisen in the other four plants. 
The building was still to be erected at the tool annexe attached 
to the Railway Workshops in Launceston; as was the case with 
the optical annexe at the university, and the Bond store at the 
Launceston Workshops. The Primer Annexe at H. Jones and Co. 
was still awaiting its plant, with production expected to 
commence in March 1942. The total outlay was £930,100. 29 
Cosgrove expressed concern over these delays in production in a 
press statement of 26 March 1942. 30 He had good reason to 
complain. The war had been underway for over two years, and 
the work being undertaken in Tasmania should have been in 
production for nearly all that time. The inability of this work to 
be in full production by this stage in the war illustrates a lack 
of Commonwealth-State relations. 
29H.B. Bennett, Chairman, Board of Area Management, to Cosgrove. 27 
January 1942. P.O. 43/5/42 AOT; Alison Alexander, Glenorchy 1804-  
1964(Glenorchy, 1986), pp.272-273; Richard Davis, Open to talent(Hobart, 
1991), p. 109. 
30Press Statement of Cosgrove, 26 March 1942. P.O. 43/5/42 AOT. 
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With the participation of the Japanese in the war, the 
government drew up plans covering a possible invasion of 
Australia. The possibility of Japan entering the war was seen as 
early as June 1940. This illustrated the importance of the Dutch 
East Indies, and French Indo-China, which was seen as a 
Japanese target. By February 1941, war with Japan was 
considered likely, making the continuous defence of the coast a 
necessity. 31 An evacuation committee was created in January 
1942, with Cosgrove, as Minister for Civil Defence, in the 
chair. 32 The three requirements of the committee were: the need 
to decrease the population of target areas; to "Evacuate a 
proportion of the Civil population from forward areas in 
anticipation of raids or invasion"; and, to evacuate people from 
forward areas in case of invasion. This was necessary with the 
knowledge a submarine could enter the Derwent, and travel 
underwater as far as Hobart. 33 
Cosgrove perceived problems in carrying out an evacuation. 
Plans for a large scale evacuation were available, and covered all 
the major areas, such as accommodation, food, and bedding, as 
well as the places to be evacuated, and where the evacuees were 
to be taken. Cosgrove suggested the best the government could 
hope to achieve was the evacuation of people from the target 
areas as set out by the military. He suggested the movement of 
31A.H.Q. Operational Instruction No. 1, 22 June 1940: Australian Military 
forces-6th Military District. S/39/56. CA. 
32P.0. 43/10/42 AOT 
33Australian Military forces-6th Military District. 15 December 1940. 
S/39/56. CA. 
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30,000 women and children was too difficult to hope to 
accomplish. 34 The idea of evacuating so many people was not 
helped by Prime Minister Curtin's statement that large scale 
evacuation resulting from invasion "would be detrimental to the 
morale of the people and should be strongly discouraged", 
although a limited evacuation might be possible. 35 It was likely 
there would have been difficulties in carrying out these plans. In 
the event of an invasion of Australia, especially if the national 
capital fell, then the entirety of the country would then have to 
capitulate to the occupying forces. In this scenario, there did 
not seem to be much point of working out a way of evacuating 
the people of Hobart, short of setting up a government in exile. 
Should Tasmania be the target, the likelihood of the State 
Goverrunent surviving would be small. 
This was followed in the following April by protestations from 
G.A. Walch, Director of Civil Defence. He viewed the idea of 
moving 33,500 people to the New Norfolk and Hamilton 
Municipalities 36 , and housing them in hop kilns, wool and 
shearing sheds, with concern. It would, he believed, have moral 
and physical effects. This, he considered, would be worse than 
leaving them where they were living, even if they were under fire. 
If it was necessary to move them, it would be far better for them 
to be temporarily evacuated to the hills. If evacuation was 
necessary, these people-expectant mothers, women with 
children under 5 years, and old aged, invalid, and infirm people, 
34Cosgrove to H.J.R Cole, Town Clerk, Hobart, 1 April 1942. P.O. 43/10/42 
AOT 
36Prime Minister Curtin to Cosgrove, 22 May 1942. P.O. 43/10/42 AOT 
3622,500 were to go to New Norfolk, whilst 10,000 were to go to Hamilton. 
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who would not number more than 10,000-would be better off in 
private homes, and hop pickers' huts. It was also necessary to 
have the Hobart City Council to make plans for the evacuation 
of 2,000 people, who might have to leave target or bombed out 
areas, to be accommodated in Hobart. 37 
In the previous January, the civil defence organisation in 
Hobart was tested in a scenario covering a Japanese aerial 
attack. Supervised by Colonel H.H. Dean of the Department of 
Home Security, the final report praised most of the participants, 
although he believed the term 'special constable' was confusing. 
Some of these people lacked the necessary skills. 38 In the 
second half of 1940, Lieut-Col. R.W.M. Thirkell, Director of 
Civilian Defence and State Cooperation, had toured Australia, 
and inspected the civil defence systems in each state. His belief 
that "with short intensified training and if issued with 
equipment" he reasonably expected Tasmania and South 
Australia to deal with an emergency 39 , agrees with Dean's report 
written two and a half years later. The problem with both of 
these reports was they were working on ideal conditions. The 
Japanese might only have sent in five planes as 'occurred' in the 
test in 1943, but unless there was an actual attack, there was 
no real way of testing the defence mechanisms of Hobart. 
By the beginning of 1943, the manufacture of munitions was in 
full production. Output at the shell annexe in Launceston had 
37Walch to Commander, Tasmanian Forces, Anglesea Barracks, 5 April 1943. 
P.O. 43/11/43 AOT 
38P.0. 43/3/43 AOT 
39Hasluck vol 2, pp. 640-641. 
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increased from three thousand to seven thousand five hundred 
units per week, which was expected to reach ten thousand 
within a few weeks. More machinery was expected to arrive from 
the Commonwealth for other types of shells, to be produced at a 
rate of three thousand per week, which was to require a 
proportional increase in staff. The tool annexe was employing 
eighty-three skilled staff, and the Commonwealth Government 
had already supplied machinery to the value of £80,000. The 
optical munitions annexe at the university commenced 
production in May 1942, and the building and equipment had 
been expanded. The building and plant were worth about 
1.36,000, all of which had been given by the Commonwealth. 
There was a staff in excess of one hundred and forty, which was 
to be increased to more than two hundred. The primer annexe 
was in full production, with a staff of one hundred and fifty, 
whilst the plant was to stay as it was; and the bond store was 
in constant use. By this stage in the war, approximately fifty-
four local contractors had been working on engineering projects 
in the previous twelve months, worth a total of 205,000. 40 The 
total value of munition produced in Tasmania during the 
1942/43 financial year was £3,000,000. 41 
The arrival of 1944 saw the loosening of some of the war-time 
regulations. In January, baffle walls, bricked up windows, and 
glass protection could be removed. "The decision must not", 
wrote H.P. Lazzarini, Minister for Home Security, "be regarded 
40Cosgrove's address to Commonwealth Grants Commission. Hobart, 11 
February 1943. P.O. 43/22/43 AOT. 
41 'PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS IN TASMANIA', M. 7 August 1943. 
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as an indication that we can relax our maximum war effort." 42 
In June, permission was given for all areas beyond 20 degrees 
south to remove all shelters where the space could be better 
used for war effort, "or where in the opinion of the State 
Authorities relaxations should be granted to provide adequate 
natural light and ventilation"; trench and outside shelters made 
from timber or galvanised steel may be removed in cases where 
the material was needed, or were a danger; pill boxes, which had 
been constructed up Elizabeth Street the previous year43 , were 
not to be demolished; and "Main splinter-roof walling at bulk oil 
installations erected as a result of Orders issued under a 
National Security (Protection of Bulk Oil Installations) 
Regulations shall not be dismantled at this stage."44 By 
September, the policy on pill boxes had been altered to allow for 
their dismantling if the State authorities considered them a 
nuisance or health hazard. 45 
By this stage in the war, the Allied forces were advancing 
against the Axis powers. In Europe, the American led forces had 
landed at Normandy, with Paris regained by the forces of Free 
France in late August; whilst the Soviet forces had regained 
most of its homeland. In the Pacific theatre, the Allied forces 
were on the verge of re-taking the Philippines. 
By the second half of 1944, there were signs of a decrease in the 
42Telegram from H P Lazzarini, Minister for Home Security, to Cosgrove, 12 
January 1944. P.O. 43/6/44 AOT 
43P.O. 43/15/43 AOT 
44Press Statement by Lazzarini, 30 June 1944. P.O. 43/6/44 AOT 
45Prime Minister Curtin to Cosgrove, 29 September 1944. P.O. 43/12/44 AOT 
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production of munitions in Tasmania. J. Harold Brown, State 
Secretary of the Metal and Munitions Union, in a letter to the 
Premier, expressed concern over rumours circulating to the 
effect the Derwent Park factory was to be closed. Although he 
replied, "You may be sure that every effort will be made to see 
that these buildings will continue to be used for industrial 
purposes"46 , Cosgrove must have realised at this stage the 
future for the plant, at least in the area of war production, was 
limited, and its ability to remain open after the cessation of 
hostilities would rest with the make up of post-war 
reconstruction. As it was, the end of munitions production in 
Hobart came in early 1945. 47 The total value of munition 
produced at the Launceston Railway Annexe during the war was 
Z1,500,00048 , which easily justifies the almost £12,000,000 
spent by the Commonwalth Government for the entirety of 
Tasmania.49 
At the end of the year, the policy towards Civil Defence as a 
whole came under review. It was to go onto a reserve footing, 
only to be called up if needed. There was to be a small central 
staff so as to keep information up to date. The part-time local 
authorities were to stay, and they were to keep up to date 
records of those who had been trained. Other voluntary 
organisations were to be kept as needed. The public warning 
systems were no longer needed. The Defence Committee had 
46J. Harold Brown State Secretary, Metal and Munitions Union, to Cosgrove, 
24 July 1944; Cosgrove to Brown, 28 July 1944. P.O. 43/32/44 AOT. 	. 
47 'MUNITION PRODUCTION IN HOBART TO CEASE M, 1 January 1945. P.O. 
43/1/45 AOT 
O'Brien, oo.cit., p. 46. 
49Ibid., p.30. 
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agreed, in principle, to keep a nucleus of civil defence after the 
war had ended.5° 
In early 1945, with the war close to an end, there was a further 
relaxation of shelter regulations by the War Cabinet. They 
considered them no longer necessary; demolition could begin 
"subject to the approval of the Manpower Authorities and to the 
National Security (Building Operations) Regulations"; although 
the Commonwealth could not afford to give the States any 
manpower for this operation. 51 The conclusion of hostilities 
witnessed the disbanding of the Civil Defence Legion. It ceased 
to exist from 4 October 1945, 6 years 8 months after Ogilvie 
brought it into existence. 
• 
50acting Prime Minister to Cosgrove (CIRCULAR), 29 December 1944. P.O. 
43/4/45 AOT 
51Prime Minister Curtin to Cosgrove (CIRCULAR), 2 February 1945. P.O. 
43/14/45 AOT 
CHAPTER TWO 
CIVIL WORK IN A WAR-TIME 
SITUATION 
"Robert Cosgrove impressed as a moderate, well-
balanced and most patriotic man to lead the state 
in wartime" 
L.L. Robson, A history of Tasmania volume 2,  p.483. 
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During the war years, not only was there the problem of 
defending Tasmania against the ever present danger of enemy 
invasion', but also the normal activities of governing the 
state. During the first six years of his premiership, Cosgrove 
faced the problems of post-war reconstruction, a state 
election, and extra responsibilities, not least of which was 
administering the HEC Act. Added to this were areas unique 
to this period. The first of these was the introduction of 
uniform taxation. Since 1942, the taxpayers of Australia 
have paid income tax to the Commonwealth Government. 
Secondly, there was an unsuccessful attempt to extend the 
powers of the Commonwealth Government, which, had it 
been successful, would have ensured the name of Robert 
Cosgrove would have been remembered throughout the 
country, rather than just in Tasmania. 
When Cosgrove succeeded to the premiership, he retained 
almost exactly the same cabinet as Ogilvie. Dwyer-Gray went 
back to the Treasury, whilst E.J. Ogilvie, the late Premier's 
brother, and Davies retained the portfolios they held under 
Ogilvie. D'Alton, who had been given Agriculture, Commerce, 
Forestry, and Agricultural Bank under Dwyer-Gray retained 
all but Commerce, whilst Brooker, who had been brought 
into the cabinet, retained Chief Secretary and Transport. 
Gaha, Madden, and McDonald, who were members of the 
Executive Council without office, retained their positions, 
and were joined by Lewis and Becker. 2 This retention of 
'see Chapter 1. 
2V&P, vol ad, 1949. 
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portfolios would confirm Cosgrove was seeking continuity 
and stability. 
Between 1940 and 1945, there were eleven cabinets. Of the 
nine ministers in his first cabinet, only four-Cosgrove, James 
McDonald, Brooker, and James Madden-were still holding 
ministerial portfolios by the end of 1945. From his original 
cabinet, Eric Ogilvie resigned his post in August 1940, 
Thomas Davies died in September 1942, D'Alton had become 
High Commissioner to New Zealand, John Gaha moved to 
the Commonwealth Parliament, and Dwyer-Gray died in 
December 1945. 
Preparation for post-war reconstruction began in February 
1940, with the presentation of papers to the Economic 
Cabinet within the Menzies Government. 3 In Tasmania, this 
started later in the year, when the Prime Minister sent a 
letter to Cosgrove seeking the government's co-operation, to 
ensure there were not any conflicts between the 
Commonwealth and State Instrumentalities, in the area 
preference of employment to returned soldiers. 4 
At the same time, the federal Department of Labour and 
National Service was created with the sole purpose of "post-
war rehabilitation and reconstruction". 5 In the following 
January, Menzies sought Cosgrove's co-operation with the 
3Paul Hasluck, The Government and the people vol 1(Canberra, 1952), p. 
189. 
4Menzies to Cosgrove, 7 October 1940. P.O. 84/41/40. Aar. 
5Hasluck vol 1, p. 470. 
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work of this new department. He informed the Premier the 
work to be undertaken covered the reinstatement of soldiers 
to civil life, and the absorption of munitions workers. There 
was the need for co-operation between the Commonwealth 
and State Governments, and a conference was to be held 
soon.6 Cosgrove replied stating the State Government were 
happy to co-operate.7 
• Harold Holt, Minister for Labour and National Service, 
believed plans had to be made on the assumption the Allied 
forces would win the war based "on the view that if we are 
defeated somebody else will probably be doing our planning 
for us." He stated there was no point waiting for the war to 
end before commencing plans for post-war reconstruction, 
and there was a need to ensure there was no overlapping or 
duplication. The Reconstruction Directorate of his 
department was to be the general secretariat. He put forward 
a seven point plan. Supervise industrial development, which 
areas were to be permanent; the same for export markets; the 
training and placement in civil occupations of demobilised 
personnel and munition workers; reconstruction proposals 
and policies in other countries; what Australia's interests 
will be "in the various types of international settlements that 
may come after the war"; governmental checking of their 
financial and industrial policies and their effects, modify 
where necessary; and, education of people on the problems of 
reconstruction. Co-operation was sought through Premiers.' 
6Menzies to Cosgrove, 17 January 1941. P.O. 84/5/41. AOT. 
7Cosgrove to Menzies, 21 January 1941. P.O. 84/5/41. AOT. 
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conferences, Loans Council, Agricultural Council, and other 
ministerial conferences. There was also to be a liaison 
officer. 8 For this position, Cosgrove chose Dr E.R. Walker, 
Professor of Economics at the University of Tasmania. 9 
The Commonwealth Government set up an Inter-
Departmental Advisory Committee, chaired by the Minister 
for Labour and National Service, with Dr H.V. Evatt as his 
deputy. A conference of State officers with officials of the 
Reconstruction Division was set down for 10 June.' 0 
Cosgrove wrote to the Prime Minister seeking a postponement 
due to problems arising, but as there were difficulties with 
the late arrival of the Premier's letter, and the Western 
Australian delegate was on his way to Canberra, this was not 
possible." 
In July, at the advice of Professor Walker, a State 
Investigational Committee was formed to ensure no 
overlapping of work. 12 Cosgrove was the Chairman, with the 
Director of Public Works, Commissioner of Transport, 
Walker, Chairman of the State Financial Committee, and 
F.J. Carter, Assistant Under Secretary as members. 13 News of 
8Statement from Harold Holt, 4 February 1941(?). P.O. 84/5/41. AOT 
9Cosgrove to Fadden. acting Prime Minister, 7 May 1941.P.0. 84/5/41. 
AOT. 
10Fadden to Cosgrove, 24 May 1941. P.O. 84/5/41. AOT. 
"Cosgrove to Prime Minister, 30 May 1941: Minister for Labour to 
Cosgrove (telegram), 4 June 1941. P.O. 84/5/41. AOT. 
12Walker to Cosgrove (memo), 30 June 1941; 'POST-WAR 
RECONSTRUCTION', M.  17 July 1941. P.0.84/5/41. AOT. 
13Cosgrove to R.G. Osborne, Chairman, State Financial Committee, 26 
September 1941. P.O. 84/5/41. AOT. Although it had a different name, 
the Post-War Reconstruction Committee seems to have been the same as 
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the creation of this body was sent to the Secretary of the 
Department of Labour and National Service." 
At the end of November 1941, the parliament was prorogued, 
and an election set down for 13 December. In addressing the 
people of Tasmania, Cosgrove based his case for the re-
election of his government on the record set. In his policy 
speech, he talked about the work done in areas such as 
munitions, improvements in health care, housing, as well as 
ensuring the continuance of hydro electricity, despite the 
drain of work force, and the setting up of a joint select 
committee on the constitution. 15 Support came, as was to be 
expected, from the Voice. 
Columns could be written about the achievements 
of the Cosgrove Administration, but this is 
unnecessary in these enlightened days. 16 
Throughout the campaign, eight editorials between 20 
November and 15 December discussed the choice of the 
electors. From the beginning, the Mercury was against the 
government. From suggesting they lacked a policy 17 , it went 
on to advise its readers "The Labour Party fails lamentably to 
offer a prograrnme." 18 The editor went on to suggest 
Either the Premier was so taken with the idea of 
springing an election on his opponents that he 
overlooked the need for a policy, or he believed the 
the State Investigational Committee mentioned by Walker in the previous 
June. 
14F.J. Carter to Roland Wilson, Secretary, Department of Labour and 
National Service, 26 September 1941. P.O. 84/5/41. AOT • 
16`LABOUR'S PROGRAMME', M, 20 November 1941. 
16V, 15 November 1941. 
17'POLICY SPEECH WITHOUT POLICY', M.  20 November 1941. 
18'5TA1E NOMINATIONS', M, 25 November 1941. 
electorate would be dazzled by the brassy glitter of 
Labour 'achievement'. 
He went on to suggest the best of Labor's policies were 
"borrowed from the Nationalist Party." 19 Had the voters 
taken heed of the views of the editor of the Mercury, they 
would have voted overwhelmingly for the Nationalist party, 
whose policies were "sound and practical, easily capable of 
performance even in these times." 20 The Japanese invasion of 
Pearl Harbour cut short the campaign 21 , so that even though 
no occupying forces ever set foot on Tasmanian soil, they did 
nevertheless effect our democratic system of government. 
Despite the best efforts of the Mercury-"No words need be 
wasted in regrets of recriminations over the decision of the 
electors"22-the government was returned with an increased 
majority. New members included A.J. White, a future Agent-
General for Tasmania in London, for Labor, and Sir John 
McPhee, a former Premier, for the Nationalists. The 
government finished with a ten seat majority in a house of 
thirty members. 23 The election was notable for being the first 
in which candidates were linked as parties, so that the 
electors could easily tell which contenders were with which 
groups. 24 
19'LABOUR'S PATCHWORK POLICY', M.  4 December 1941. 
20'5-TATE NOMINATIONS', M, 25 November 1941. 
21 'ANNOUNCEMENT by THE PREMIER', M. 10 December 1941. 
22 'LABOUR GOVERNMENTS WIN', M, 15 December 1941. 
23WA. Townsley, Tasmania from colony to statehood 1803-1945(Hobart,  
1991), P. 425. 
24'STATE NOMINATIONS', M, 25 November 1941. 
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Davis, in Eighty years Labor, suggests the reason for the 
Labor win was the memory of Ogilvie. 25 There is much in this 
argument. As the basis of the election campaign was Labor's 
achievements since 1934, the voters almost certainly kept 
this in mind when casting their votes. The last time the 
people had gone to the polls was in 1937, and as only half of 
the intervening period had seen Cosgrove as premier, there is 
not very much which they could have judged as purely his 
achievements. 
In early 1941, a plan came forward from Canberra for the 
unification of taxation. In a statement to a conference of 
State Premiers, Arthur Fadden, acting Prime Minister, 
suggested 
If a uniform income taxation could be imposed over 
the whole of Australia to cover both State and 
Federal requirements, some millions of additional 
revenue could be raised without exceeding the level 
of taxation now reached in the highest taxing State 
from Commonwealth and State taxation combined. 
He went on to state, 
It would not be reasonable to suggest full 
compensation for loss of revenue. The higher taxing 
States should submit to the consequences of some 
loss of revenue in order to balance the increased 
taxation falling on the people of the less highly 
taxed States. 26 
At first, this idea gained support in Tasmania. The State 
Finance Committee recommended to the government it 
should support this move27, however within three weeks of it 
25(Hobart, 1983), p.39. 
26acting Prime Minister's statement to taxation conference of State 
Premiers, 6 February 1941. P.O. 115/6/41. AOT. 
27State Finance Committee, 1 April 1942. P.O. 115/6/41. AOT. 
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being formally announced 28 , the Cosgrove Government had 
changed its mind.29 Before the end of June, the plans had 
been dropped39 , with the vote against its adoption being 
Unanimous. 31 
In the following year, the idea was resurrected by the Curtin 
Government, and successfully introduced. The initial plans 
were for the provision of uniform taxation to be handed over 
to the Commonwealth Government for the duration of the 
war, plus twelve months. 32 If this was adhered to, income 
taxation would have been returned to the State Governments 
by September 1946, although for convenience, it would have 
continued until 30 June 1947. 
Edmund Dwyer-Gray, Tasmanian Treasurer, recommended to 
Cosgrove he should not oppose the legislation on the 
grounds of States rights, rather on the basis it would 
adversely effect the solvency of the States, especially 
Tasmania. Even if the States objected to the move, Dwyer-
Gray believed the Curtin Government could unify the 
payment of income tax using the National Security Act, or by 
passing taxation legislation. In any case, he believed such an 
alteration could not be permanent since it contravened the 
Commonwealth Constitution. 33 
28 'UNIFORM TAXES', M, 26 June 1941. 
29'UNIFORMI1Y IN TAXES', M, 26 June 1941. 
3 FEDERAL TAX PLAN ABANDONED', M.  28 June 1941. 
31 'PREMIERS REJECT UNIFICATION' (Editorial), M, 30 June 1941. 
32Prime Minister Curtin to Cosgrove. 1 April 1942. P.O. 115/5/42. AOT. 
33Dwyer-Gray to Cosgrove. 13 April 1942. P.O. 115/5/42. AOT 
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In late May, Cosgrove, in a telegram to J.B. Chifley, the 
Federal Treasurer, sought the acceptance of the proposal of 
the Queensland Premier. He sought the removal of clause 30, 
which dealt with the priority of the collection of taxation, 
and the inclusion of clause 14A, which would have meant 
the collection of taxes was a joint Commonwealth-State 
affair. 34 However, in his reply, Chifley said this could not be 
done on constitutional grounds, although he did not 
elaborate further. 35 
The legislation was passed by both houses of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, although this was due to some 
members of the opposition crossing the floor. 36 Prominent 
amongst these were Arthur Fadden, Leader of the Opposition, 
and Percy Spender. The second reading passed the House of 
Representatives with ease-forty-one ayes against eleven noes-
whereas it only gained a majority' of eight in the Senate.37 An 
appeal was lodged in the High Court by four State 
Governments. 38 After deliberation by cabinet, it was decided 
Tasmania would not join in this case39 , despite Cosgrove's 
dislike of the centralisation of these powers. 
34Cosgrove to Chifley, 28 May 1942. P.O. 115/5/42. AOT. 
35Chifley to Cosgrove, 29 May 1942. P.O. 115/5/42. AOT. 
36Ross McMullin Light on the hill(Melbourne, 1991). p. 220. 
37Commonwealth Hansard, vol 171, pp. 1747, 1991. 
38South Australia v Commonwealth, Commonwealth Law Reports, Vol. 
65, pp.373-472. 
39Press Statement, 10 June 1942: Cosgrove to Curtin, 18 June 1942. P.O. 
115/5/42. AOT. 
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The States based their appeal on what they believed to be 
violations of sections fifty-one, ninety-six, and ninety-nine of 
the Commonwealth Constitution. Chifley 
said that the Government did not 'seek to take 
away from the States their power to impose taxes 
upon incomes, but proposes to make a payment of 
financial assistance to any State which agrees to 
suspend their power in the interests of national 
defence'. 40 
The states lost their appeal by a majority of three judges to 
two. 41 Motions opposing the Commonwealth Government's 
move were made before the federal executive of the Australian 
Labor Party42 , and the 1942 and 1945 Tasmanian ALP 
conferences43 , although the latter two, at least, were 
defeated. 
During the six years of Cosgrove's term as Premier, 1940-45, 
a total of five hundred and fifty-seven Bills were introduced 
into the House of Assembly. Of these, one hundred and 
thirteen did not pass through both houses, and two hundred 
and ninety-one were passed by the Legislative Council 
without amendments.44 Conflicts with the upper house were 
a constant problem for Cosgrove. On five occasions during 
40c hifley quoted in Paul Hasluck The government and the people vol 2 
(Canberra, 1970), p. 318. 
41 Gavin Souter Acts of parliament(Melbourne, 1988), p.351. 
42Patrick Weller and Beverley Lloyd,Federal executive minutes 1915-1955 
(Melbourne, 1978), p.244 
43 Minutes of meeting of annual conference. NS/788/13. AOT. 
44 1940: 111 Bills 85 Acts 52 not amended 
1941: 93 Bills 71 Acts 47 not amended 
1942: 91 Bills 73 Acts 47 not amended 
1943: 85 Bills 70 Acts 46 not amended 
1944: 90 Bills 76 Acts 54 not amended 
1945: 87 Bills 69 Acts 45 not amended 
557 Bills 444 Acts 291 not amended 
V&P, vols. occii, ocxiv, cxxvi , cxxviii , cxxx. cxxxii. 
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the war, he sought to alter the Tasmanian Constitution, but 
only one of these, the extension of the Legislative Council 
franchise to returned armed forces personnel, actually gained 
Royal Assent. Even in this one success, it had been achieved 
only on its third attempt. There were two attempts each at 
re-defining the Legislative Council boundaries, and 
introducing the Commonwealth powers legislation, but all 
four failed.45 
In 1942, the Commonwealth Government proposed extending 
its powers for five years after the cessation of hostilities. The 
Powers Bill was to temporarily grant to the Federal 
government certain responsibilities. To save the expense of 
holding a referendum, a special Commonwealth-State 
conference was held consisting of eight Members of the 
House of Representatives, four Senators, and the Premiers 
and Opposition Leaders of each State parliament. 46 The plan 
was that each parliament would pass the same piece of 
legislation, and in so doing, would remove the need, and 
expense, of a referendum. With bi-partisan support, the Bill 
should have gone through the State legislatures with ease. In 
the end, it was only passed by two parliaments, New South 
Wales and Queensland. In Victoria, an amendment was 
inserted seeking the assurance it would only become law if 
all the parliaments passed the legislation; whilst in South 
Australia and Western Australia, the Bill was "watered down 
• 
45P.O. 107/12/42. AOT. 
46Has1uck. vol 2, p.524. 
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with amendments." 47 The referendum, which was eventually 
held, was defeated, with only two states voting 'yes'. 
If the plans of the Commonwealth Government had been 
successful, the areas over which they would have gained 
control were housing, employment, repatriation, prices, 
production, distribution of goods, marketing of commodities, 
trusts, combines and monopolies, family allowances, and the 
Aboriginal people. 48 Cosgrove stated repatriation ought to be 
a Commonwealth matter, and the States could not afford to 
be responsible for the payment of the dole. In a show of bi-
partisanship, H.S. Baker, Leader of the Opposition, said he 
would have liked to have moved an amendment, but instead 
accepted the Bill for the sake of the package as a whole. He 
added it was "the most important bill dealt with by the 
Legislature since the inception of Federation."49 
In Tasmania, the Bill was introduced by Cosgrove on 15 
December 1942. It was described as 
A bill to refer certain matters to the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth until the expiration of five 
years after Australia ceases to be engaged in 
hostilities in the present War. 
By suspending standing order two hundred and thirty-five, 
the Bill passed , through all the stages in one day. 50 Arriving 
at the Legislative Council on 16 December, it was read for 
47McMullin, on. cit. p. 231. 
48L.L. Robson, A history of Tasmania vol. 2(Melbourne, 1991), p.497: 
Townsley, p. 432; 'POWERS FOR COMMONWEALTH', M, 16 Decembet 
1942. 
49'POWERS FOR COMMONWEALTH', M, 16 December 1942. 
50V&P vol. cxxvi, pp. 153, 155-6(HA) 
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the first time. A motion was made, and withdrawn, to 
suspend standing orders, but the council decided to defer the 
second reading of the bill until 19 January 1943 by a division 
of ten to six. On 20 January, both Cosgrove and Baker went 
to the Legislative Council, where the Premier was allowed to 
address the chamber on why it should pass the Bill. 51 When 
it was debated again, it was on the chamber's agenda for 
three days, but was lost by a division of seven votes to ten. 52 
The action of members of the Legislative Council suggests an 
inbuilt dislike of losing any of its powers, especiallywhen 
they are being transferred to Canberra. This distrust of 
'centralisation' goes back to the days of the Constitutional 
Conventions in the latter days of the nineteenth century, 
and the fact there was bipartisan support did not not make 
any difference to the Council's opposition to the Bill. A 
similar episode was to occur in 1946. 
In 1942, Cosgrove added to his list of ministerial 
responsibilities by becoming Minister Administering the 
Hydro-Electric Commission Act. By taking on this extra 
duty, he became, at least in theory, the man responsible to 
parliament for the creation and distribution of Tasmania's 
energy supply. 
In the middle years of the war, the supply of electricity was 
seen to be as important as munitions production. In a sense, 
this was true, since the munitions factories needed 
51 'OPINIONS ON TRANSFER OF POWER', M, 21 January 1943. 
52V&P, vol cxxvi, pp. 119, 122, 125. 127(LC) 
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electricity. The HEC suffered as much as other employers 
from lack of manpower during the war, and this led to the 
slowing down of the construction of new power lines. Despite 
this handicap, full power was generally available throughout 
the 1942-43 year. Added to this, the amount of energy 
available to industries was more than fifteen thousand horse 
power over the contract amounts. The production for that 
year was up five and a half per cent over the previous year, 
and there were three thousand one hundred and ninety units 
per head of population. Despite the wartime conditions, eight 
hundred and forty-three new consumers were connected, 
compared to one thousand two hundred and sixty-three the 
previous year. The revenue for 1942-43 was £778,142, of 
which £763,644 came from the sale of energy, overall a seven 
point seven per cent increase over the previous year. Working 
expenses had also increased, this time by £595 to £225,672. 
For the first time, there was a note on surplus in an annual 
report, which for 1942-43 was E124,392. The capital 
expenditure was £619,603, taking the total at 30 June 1943 
to £8,411,645. 53 
By 1943, the question of preferential treatment of returned 
armed forces personnel was a major issue. At the 
Commonwealth level, there were the Australian Soldiers' 
Repatriation Act 1920-1943, and the War Service Land 
Settlement Agreements Act 1945. At the State level, some 
pressure came from the R.S.S.&A.I.L.A., the forerunner of the 
53HEC report, 1942 -43, V&P, Vol. c.mcix, paper 34. 
R.S.L., for legislation to be passed by the Tasmanian 
Parliament. Despite another letter from its president in 
January 1944, Cosgrove believed there was little he could do 
about it, stating it was a Commonwealth matter. 54 There 
were precedents upon which Cosgrove could have based a 
similar Bill for those returning from active service during 
World War II. The parliament of New South Wales had 
passed the Returned Soldiers and Sailors Employment Act 
immediately after the First World War, and there was the 
Discharged Servicemen's Preference Act (Vic.) 1943. 
At the 1943 and 1944 State ALP conferences, four items were 
submitted on the topic of post-war reconstruction. In the 
former, a motion was passed to set up a women's 
consultative committee in each state for post-war housing. It 
was to seek the views of women on the layout and design of 
the houses, and Na  copy of this resolution be sent to the 
Chairman of the Social Security Committee." There were 
three motions on the agenda at the 1944 conference. First, 
land for post-war reconstruction and repatriation was to be 
bought at a cost not greater than 1939 prices. Secondly, 
advances for repatriation and post-war 
reconstruction purposes shall be made available 
throughout the Commonwealth Bank at not more 
than 2 per cent administration or service charge. 
Thirdly, war industries were to be converted into businesses 
for the construction of household goods, which were to be 
sold at a cost affordable to al1. 55 
54Cosgrove to J.A. Mitchell, President, RSS&A1LA. P.O. 84/35/431 
Mitchell to Cosgrove, 4 January 1944; Press Statement, 3 May 1944. P.O. 
84/1/44. AOT. 
55Minutes of meeting of annual conference. NS/788/13. AOT. 
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Between November 1943 •and December 1945, three 
ministerial statements were made concerning post-war 
reconstruction. In the first of these, the Chief Secretary, 
John Madden, declared the major plan was "to handle the 
allocation of work to men of the forces on their discharge 
from the war", and, "to provide men with suitable 
employment to the benefit of both the State and themselves." 
This was to be done through liaison with the Commonwealth 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction, Tasmanian 
government departments, municipalities, and private 
enterprise employers. The plan not only covered those 
returning from the armed forces, but also the men and 
women who worked in the munitions factories and other 
areas of importance. 56 
Cosgrove re-introduced the Powers Bill on 30 March 1943. 
The second reading passed without problems on 1 April, 
whilst it passed through the committee stage and its third 
reading on 14 April, the day it was sent to the Legislative 
Council. The second reading in the House of Assembly was 
• passed by a vote of twenty ayes to two noes, with Messrs 
Marriott and Ockerby the only dissenters; and the vote for a 
Joint Committee of Parliament to look into the Bill was 
passed by the same margin. On 14 April, Cosgrove moved an 
amendment that read 
This Act shall not come into operation unless and 
until the Governor, by proclamation, certifies that 
the Bill for this Act has been approved by a 
56V&P Vol. cxxviii. 1943-44, pp. 120-121(HA) 
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majority of the electors at a poll of electors taken 
in accordance with a law enacted by Parliament in 
that behalf. 
It was passed by fourteen votes to ten. 57 The Bill was read for 
the first time the day it arrived in the Legislative Council. 
The second reading was deferred for six months on 26 May. 
The division was seven each, and the President's casting 
voting went against the Government. 58 By voting against the 
Bill, he destroyed any chances of it succeeding in Tasmania. 
Due to its lack of success in the country as a whole, 
Cosgrove suggested, and the Labor party agreed to put the 
fourteen points to the people as a referendum. 59 The 'Yes' 
case was led by its chief Commonwealth architect, Dr H.V. 
Evatt, Federal Attorney-General, and former Justice of the 
High Court of Australia; whilst the 'No' campaign in 
Tasmania was directed by the Tasmanian Constitutional 
League°. In writing about the referendum campaign, 
Townsley notes "the Labor Party was embarrassed by the 
strong support given by the Australian Communist Party" . 61 
Whilst it was again a legal organisation, and the Soviet 
Union was one of the Allied powers, the Australian people as 
a whole are fundamentally conservative in nature, 
particularly when it comes to changing the Commonwealth 
Constitution. The referendum was held on 19 August 1944, 
and was only passed in South Australia and Western 
57V&P Vol, =Mil, pp. 5, 13, 34-35(1-IA). 
58V&P Vol. comviii, pp. 19, 35(LC). 
59Hasluck vol 2, P.  530. 
60Robson, ou.cit., p. 497. 
61Townsley, op. cit. p. 449. 
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Australia. In Tasmania, the 'No' vote was sixty-one per cent, 
with a majority in each of the five electorates. Nation-wide, 
the 'Yes' campaign succeeded in only twenty-two of the 
seventy-four electorates. Robson notes the 'Yes' vote in 
Moonah, a very safe Labor subdivision, was only a majority 
of ninety-five votes. 62 There was an attempt to resurrect the 
Powers Bill at the Tasmanian State Conference in 1945, 
when a motion was put and passed urging the 
Commonwealth Government to try again. 63 
This had been Cosgrove's best opportunity to leave his mark 
on the national scene. It had been his idea to attempt to 
have separate Bills passed by the State legislatures, and the 
upper house of Tasmania had been amongst the most 
vehement to ensure the Bill's failure. Had the plan 
succeeded, the Australian tax-payer would have been spared 
the expense of a referendum, and Cosgrove would have left a 
major mark on Australian political history. Whilst the 
referendum failed, this episode illustartes the respect with 
which Cosgrove was held by the ALP as a whole. One of the 
curious points in this episode was the actions• of the 
Nationalist leader, H.S. Baker. A prominent member of the 
'No' campaign at the referendum, he had supported 
Cosgrove's attempts to have the Bill passed by the 
Tasmanian parliament. This change of view is odd. Whilst he 
was willing to support the Bill through parliament, Baker 
• 
62Townsley p. 450: Robson, p. 498. 
63 1945 State Conference, item 187. Minutes of meetings of annual 
conference March 1943-March 1946. NS/788/13. AOT. 
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would have realised such an attempt to change the 
Commonwealth Constitution was fraught with problems. 
Cosgrove could not have afforded to change sides, as such a 
move would have led to ,great embarrassment for the Labor 
party as a whole, especially after he had been so public in his 
support for the changes. 64 
By the end of the 1943-44 year, the HEC found it necessary 
to modify its programme, to make it as flexible as possible. It 
still suffered from a lack of manpower, but despite this, 
power plants had been erected at the Tarraleah and 
Waddamana stations, and power production had improved. 
By this time, eighty-five per cent of homes had electricity, but 
it was seen as being impossible to supply the rest. The 
commission had spent £71,836 from its reserve to extend 
into "scattered rural areas", and another £10,000 that year to 
continue this project. From 1 July 1944, it acquired the 
Launceston Corporation for £244,000 thereby supplying 
electricity to forty-two of the forty-six municipalities. This 
only left Tasman, but it was hoped to cover this area by an 
extension from Dunalley. There was a new sub-station at the 
Royal Hobart Hospital, and supply of electricity had 
increased by 12,479,000 units, or ten per cent over the 
previous year. The revenue was £803,926, an increase of 
£25,784, or three per cent, whilst the working expenses were 
£239,085, an increase of £13,413. An extra £27,000 was 
added to the reserve fund, which had been created during the 
64McMulLin, p.231; Davis, OD. cit., pp. 41-42; Robson, p. 498. 
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1942-43 year, which now totalled £61,067. Due to the war, 
no mention could be made of developments and proposals. 65 
In his 1944 statement, Edward Brooker, the minister in 
charge of post-war reconstruction, added to Madden's earlier 
report. The objectives, as Brooker saw them, were 
employment, in general and specific terms; improvement of 
the environment through housing, town and country 
planning, transport, education, social services; extension of 
social security; and freedom of opportunity. He also saw the 
post-war period in three phases. Phase one was a transition 
period, which was being dealt with in 1944. It was expected 
half of the men returning would have jobs to go to as soon as 
they returned home, but an equal number of men and women 
would be sacked straight away from these positions. This 
would, he believed, be catered for in areas of local and short-
term public works, and the commencement of long-range 
projects. Phase two would be a boom period, with little 
unemployment; whilst phase three, the post-boom period, 
would see depression off set by an extensive public works 
programme. He saw housing as the main part of post-war 
reconstruction, due to the need to - increase accommodation 
for the men returning from the war; and there was to be an 
extensive education programme. 66 Whilst Brooker did not 
suggest how long each of these periods were to last, we can, 
with the use of hindsight, suggest their parameters. Phase 
one can be seen to last until the early part of the 1950s when 
65HEC report. 1943-44, V&P. Vol. mod, paper 20. 
66V&P Vol. cxxaci, 1944-45, paper 28. 
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the last vestiges of rationing were removed. This would lead 
us to suggest phase two would constitute the remainder of 
the 1950s and all the following decade, finishing in 1974. 
This would lead onto phase three, when the member 
countries of OPEC opted to increase the price of crude oil, 
after which there was a down turn in the economies of the 
world as a whole. 
Wartime restrictions were still in place during the 1944-45 
year, but by then they had become so much a part of 
everyday life, they "produced a laissez faire outlook".The _ 
-major work-undertaken- by the HEC was at Butler's Gorge, 
where a fluctuation in manpower had meant the number of 
employees had fallen in 1943 from several hundred to less 
than one hundred. It was recognised as a Civil Construction 
Corporations project by order of the Prime Minister, and the 
Allied Works Council became responsible for the supply of 
the extra workforce. Despite this, the future looked well. The 
commission was expecting new industries, and the expansion 
of present ones after the war. During this year, a new HEC 
Act was passed by parliament. It was substantially the same 
as the old one, although there were important changes. From 
1944, the organisation was an autonomous statutary body, 
and whilst there was a Minister administering the HEC Act, 
there was no compunction for the organisation to report to 
him. This did not stop the Minister being responsible to 
parliament for the actions of the HEC. The net capital 
50 
expenditure was £575,150, and income amounted to 
£887,787, an increase of more than fourteen per cent. 67 
In the third statement on post-war reconstruction, Brooker 
noted the need to accelerate the plans due to the war ending 
earlier than expected. Despite the extensive long- and short- 
term plans, 
the absence of technical personnel in the services 
retarded, in many respects, the practical working 
out of such plans to the stage when they could be 
carried into immediate effect. 
However, it had been possible to carry out public works, 
forestry, mining, agriculture, "and other such developmental 
plans".68 
This statement came at the end of a conflict which had 
effeted everyday life around the world. This was none less so 
than in Tasmania, where Cosgrove, elected by his party three 
months after the declaration of war, governed a state at war 
with Germany, Italy, and Japan. He had become, after a brief 
interregnum, the successor to A.G. Ogilvie, and as such, 
went to the 1941 elections with a good chance of retaining 
government. The election victory was also helped by the 
condition of the opposition, and further aided by the decision 
to halt electioneering after the Japanese invasion of Pearl 
Harbour on 8 December. Cosgrove led the party to an 
election victory despite the best efforts of the Mercury. The 
rejection by the Legislative Council of the Powers Bill meant 
67HEC report 1944-45, V&P, Vol. cxxxiii, paper 16; Doug Lowe, The price 
of power(Melbourne, 1984), p.6. 
68V&P, Vol. =oda, 1945-46. paper 32. 
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Cosgrove did not gain the national recognition which he 
would have achieved had it been successful; whereas the 
upper house could not stop the introduction of uniform 
taxation in 1942. 
CHAPTER THREE 
NOW THE WAR IS OVER 
1946-48 
labor will legislate and govern for the community 
as a whole" 
1946 policy speech, p.2 
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With the cessation of hostilities, the Cosgrove 
administration entered a new phase. Before the end of 1945, 
Edmund Dwyer-Gray, Treasurer in both the Ogilvie and 
Cosgrove governments, died, and allegations came out 
suggesting corruption existed within the Forestry 
Department. The government set up a Royal Commission, 
which recommended D'Alton be tried before a judge and jury. 
Also in 1946, the Cosgrove government went to the people by 
choice, and the Legislative Council foiled his attempt to 
transfer powers of price control to the Commonwealth 
government. In the following two years, Cosgrove made two 
further attempts to alter the constitution, but again, these 
were rejected by the Tasmanian upper house. 
In the latter days of the war, allegations came forward 
suggesting bribery of members of the Forestry Department. 
The government appointed S.C. Burbury, a barrister in 
private practice, to undertake investigations into these 
charges.' He reported 
a perusal of the Audit Department File No. G.D. 
9/8 (which contains the only available material up 
to the time of the appointment of the Select 
Committee) shows that the extent and gravity of 
any allegations having any foundation other than 
mere hearsay and rumour are not nearly so great as 
the public have been led to suppose. Nor is there 
much of a tangible nature to be found from the 
evidence taken before the Select Committee. 
He added there was no evidence of irregularities in the 
actions of Tom D'Alton, a former Minister for Forests. 2 If this 
• 
1 Sir Stanley believes he was chosen because the Government thought it 
desirable that an independent barrister should supervise the initial police 
enquiries and report." Sir Stanley Burbury to author, 19 October 1992. 
2Burbury report, pp. 5, 13. SGD 26. AOT. 
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report had been accepted by the parliament, the government 
would not have suffered the repercussions surrounding the 
Royal Commission. The report was written by an independent 
authority, which should have meant acceptance by all the 
parties involved. The fact it was not illustrates the Legislative 
Council's power of review in action. 
The report was not acceptable to many members of the 
Legislative Council. Joseph Darling, MLC for Cambridge, 
complained the Burbury report was a whitewash; he, Darling, 
had further information `up his sleeve', which would not 
come out until all the facts had been presented; and he 
would push for another select committee. Similarly, Leslie 
Proctor, MLC for South Esk, believed the evidence was 
worthless as it was not given under oath. 3 
In December, a Royal Commission was drawn up to 
investigate allegations stated in the Legislative Council by 
Joseph Darling in more detail, and Richard Kirby, a judge 
from New South Wales District Court, was chosen to be the 
Royal Commissioner. The Burbury report had cleared D'Alton 
of any charges, so theoretically, there was no need for a 
further investigation. The most probable reason why the 
matter went any further was pressure from the Legislative 
Council. Darling had been an ardent opponent of D'Alton for 
a long time, whereas the Mercury, not known as a long-term 
supporter of the government, did not push for a Royal 
37ACTS "UP HIS SLEEVE" WILL STAGGER GOVERNMENT, SAYS MLC 
ON FORESTRY', M. 18 October 1945. 
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Commission.4 The Royal Commission began its hearings on 
18 January 1946, sat until early March, and examined 
twenty-six witnesses, six of whom were in Melbourne. A copy 
of the transcript of the Royal Commission, a tome in excess 
of one thousand pages, was made available to D'Alton, who 
was still occupying the Australian High Commissionership in 
Wellington. 
The commission sought to investigate seven points. These 
were the improper sale of land at Lake Leake; the payment of 
£5000 to the Hon W.P. Taylor, Minister for Forests; 
irregularities in the Forestry Department as shown in the 
Burbury report; bribery of officers in this department; the 
allegations brought forward by Joseph Darling; allegations of 
bribery of E N West MHA5 , and Secretary of the Tasmanian 
branch of the ALP, by Alstergren Pty Ltd; and, alleged bribery 
of subsequent Forest Ministers. Mr Justice Kirby had until 
28 February 1946 to report his findings concerning 
paragraphs 1 and 2; and until 31 March 1946 for the 
remaining areas. 6 The Royal Commissioner recommended 
Edvard Aarstad Alstergren, William George Nosworthy, the 
majority shareholders of Alstergren Pty Ltd, and D'Alton 
stand trial to answer charges of corruption under sections 83 
and 266 of the Criminal Code. 7 
4A.G.L. Haig, 'Politics and the individual: the case of Thomas D'Alton', 
unpublished paper presented to the Centre for Tasmanian Historical 
Studies, 6 November 1992. 
5Ernest West came to Tasmania as a farm boy in the 1920s through a 
migration scheme, and is treated in more detail in chapter 5 of a thesis by • 
Yvonne Furneaux-Young. 
6V8EP vol. coodii, 1945-46, paper 39. 
p. 36. 
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To try the two businessmen, the Solicitor-General, 
representing the Tasmanian government, sought their 
extradition from Victoria. This attempt was unsuccessful. In 
his judgement, Mr Justice Martin stated there was clear 
evidence both Alstergren and Nosworthy had business 
dealings with the Tasmanian government. It was also evident 
D'Alton used his position as a Minister in the administration 
to gain favours for both men. Sometime before the 1941 
election, Nosworthy said the Cosgrove government had 
performed well in gaining new industries to set up in , 
Tzisin'ania, and he would donate S300 to the -ALP eleon 
expenses. There was, however, evidence the money sent to 
D'Alton did not reach the party, and suggestions he gave 
favours to Alstergren and Nosworthy, thereby acting other 
than in the best interests of the Tasmanian government. He 
may, however, have acted in this way because Alstergren, 
Nosworthy, or both were friends, and independently of the 
money. Mr Justice Martin concluded by stating that neither 
of the businessmen appeared before the Royal Commission, 
or even filed affidavits, that suggested they were either guilty, 
or were indifferent to dishonesty. He said there was a great 
suspicion of guilt on the part of Alstergren and Nosworthy, 
but, in refusing the extradition order, referred to the words of 
Chief Justice Madden in O'Donnell v. Heslop8, who stated 
the facts on which the prosecution is launched are 
so flimsy that according to the principles on which 
preliminary trials are conducted the magistrate 
8 Victorian Law Report, 1910, pp.162-177. 
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would come to the conclusion that no jury would 
convict the accused. 
Mr Justice Martin, in presenting his judgement, stated there 
was evidence of Alstergren and Nosworthy sending money to 
D'Alton, and that there was a good chance it was for corrupt 
reasons. One possible reason for not ordering the extradition 
of Alstergren and Nosworthy, was the court's wish not to co-
operate with the Tasmanian government. The expense of 
appealing to the High Court, even if it was possible, would 
ensure Cosgrove, and James McDonald, the State Attorney-
General, would have to accept the decision of the Victorian 
judges. 
The refusal, by the Victorian court, to order the extradition 
of the businessmen, meant it was not advisable to continue 
the case against D'Alton. It would be difficult, stated Gibson, 
to test D'Alton's explanations if he was the only person 
tried. At the end of September 1946, the Solicitor-General 
filed a Nolle Prose qui, thereby ending any likelihood of a case 
being contested against the former Minister for Forests. 9 
After the case came to an end, D'Alton sought re-election to 
the Tasmanian Parliament. On 22 November 1947, he gained 
the Legislative Council seat of Gordon, which had been 
vacant sipie the death of James McDonald, a former 
Attorney-General in the Cosgrove government. Peter Hay, in 
his doctoral thesis on corruption, believes D'Alton's election 
9SGD 26. AOT. 
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to the Council was due to the fear of communism, 
dissatisfaction with economic restrictions, and the findings 
of the Royal Commission. He also believes it is worthy of 
note that D'Alton was elected as a Labor party member in a 
house of independents, although he also notes Gordon was 
traditionally a safe seat for the ALP. 10 The findings of the 
Royal Commission certainly did not do his electoral chances 
any harm. Any grievance the electors may have held against 
D'Alton were soon forgotten. After his first election, D'Alton 
retained his seat in the Council with the need to compete for 
it again. In 1952, 1958, and 1964, D'Alton won the seat 
without the need and expense of a re-election campaign." 
From January 1946 to July 1948, 257 Bills were introduced 
into the House of Assembly Of these, 209 gained Royal 
Assent, and 126 passed through the Legislative Council 
without amendments. 12 . Taken as a whole, the statistics for 
this period are comparable with those of 1940-45. 
During 1946, a number of Bills of some note were introduced 
in the House of Assembly. Some, such as the Payment of 
10P.R. Hay, "Problems in the analysis of political corruption", 
unpublished PhD thesis, Hobart, University of Tasmania, 1976, pp. 192- 
193. 
"Haig, OD. Cit. 
12 1946 89 Bills 77 Acts 49 not amended 
1947 119 Bills 100 Acts 53 not amended 
1948 49 Bills 32 Acts 24 not amended 
257 Bills 209 Acts 126 not amended 
This included Neil Campbell's private member's bill in 1948. The 
Tasmanian Woolgrowers' Trustee and Executor Company Bill became Act 
15/1947, and was one of the Bills to proceed through the Council 
without amendment. It was the only private member's bill during this 
period. V&P, vols. cxxactv, =owl, CXXXViii. 
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members, and Ministers of the Crown Bills gained Royal 
Assent. Others, such as the Bill to increase the wages of 
Tasmania's judges did not get any further than being sent to 
the Legislative Council; whilst the attempt by the 
government to hand over to the Commonwealth Government 
the power of price control for three years, was overwhelmingly 
defeated on the floor of the Council. 
The Ministers of the Crown Bill sought to have a new section 
added to the existing Act, in which honorary ministers would 
gain an annual salary of £300, plus other allowances, with 
the wages coming 'out of consolidated revenUe`; There was, — 
however, the limit of three such ministers at any time. 13 
Both of the Acts mentioned dealt with money payable to 
members of parliament. It would, however, be too easy to 
assume this was the sole reason for their success. The 
position of honorary minister was one whereby a member of 
the government party could sit in cabinet without the 
pressure of a portfolio, helping ministers, and gain 
experience. By paying them, the parliament recognised the 
work they were undertaking, rewarding them with a wage, in 
the hope it would prepare them for work in a portfolio when 
one was offered. 
The unsuccessful attempt to transfer the power of price 
control to the Commonwealth Government is an interesting 
example of the obstinancy of the Legislative Council. In early 
13P.O. 107/5/46. Aar. 
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February 1946, Cosgrove sought from the Chief 
Parliamentary Draftsman, a Bill to transfer to the 
Commonwealth authorities, for three years, certain powers 
over price contro1. 14 In his memorandum to the Premier, 
R.G. Osborne pointed out all the other states had already 
passed their respective Acts, although in the case of Victoria, 
it was not in force. The various Acts were to be in operation 
for various periods of time. In New South Wales, Victoria (if 
proclaimed), and Queensland, the Acts were to last five years; 
in South Australia for three years; and in Western Australia 
for two years. He thought it best the Tasmanian Act should 
cover all the areas covered by other legislation, although it 
should not cover "prices charged by State or local 
authorities, and the prevention of profiteering." 15 The Bill, 
introduced into the House later that month, was passed in 
early March, with Ockerby the only dissenter. Whilst there 
were problems with the idea of transfering these powers, the 
majority in the House believed it "had served a useful 
purpose during the war." 16 Even the Mercury considered it 
was a good idea, although it thought it would have been 
happier if there was a yearly review. 17 The problem arose 
when the Bill was in the Legislative Council. It was rejected 
14 Memo from Cosgrove to Attorney-General, 5 February 1946. P.O. 
129/2/46. AOT. 
15RG. Osborne, Chief Parliamentary Draftsman, to Cosgrove, 15 February 
1946. P.O. 129/2/46. AOT. 
16Transfer Of Price Control Powers', M, 20 February 1946; TRANSFER OF 
PRICE POWER TO COMMONWEALTH', M, 7 March 1946. 
17'PRICE CONTROL ONLY WHILE NEEDEDIEditorial), M, 7 March 1946. 
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by a large majority at the end of March, an action the 
Mercury believed to be short-sighted. 18 
This was the second time during Cosgrove's term as Premier 
the Legislative Council had rejected legislation of this type. 
On both occasions, it had gained bipartisan support in the 
House of Assembly. These rejections illustrate the in-built 
conservatism of the Tasmanian upper house. It had used its 
position of great power to ensure the State parliament did 
not lose any powers to the Commonwealth government. 
In its first report following the declaration of peace, the HEC 
made the point of the difficulty ahead of changing from war-
time to peace-time conditions. Having been an industry of 
much importance during the war, it was to lose the internee 
labour that helped it during its hard times. These people were 
to be repatriated into Australian society, their jobs were to be 
given to the soldiers returning from the war. In April 1946, 
the commission announced there was an increase in the 
demand for energy. There was to be the erection of two new 
plants as soon as sufficient manpower was available. 19 It 
was due to a shortage in this area that the construction of 
the Clark Dam was behind schedule. The original completion 
date of the winter of 1946, which was already two years 
behind schedule20 , was set back by another two, making it 
18`Tasmania In "Uncompromising Isolation" Through Council's Prices 
Decision', 'CONTROL OVER PRICESIEditorial), M. 22 March 1946. 
19'Likely Power demands Of new Industries', M.  15 April 1946; 'Meeting 
Demand for Power', E. 15 April 1946. 
20'COMPLETION OF BUTLERS GORGE DAM', M, 20 March 1946. 
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unlikely the project would be finished before 1950. On a 
happier note, there had been 2568 new consumers connected, 
an increase of 78.3 per cent, with seventy-three per cent of 
these people living in the rural areas of Tasmania: whilst 
electricity to retail consumers increased by 8.7 per cent. 21 
In November, the people of Tasmania were asked to elect a 
new House of Assembly. The 1946 State election has been 
y declared "one of the dullest on record". 22 It saw the 
return of the government, with a substantially reduced 
majority. Elections normally gain some front page news 
stories, but in this case, there was hardly a mention of it on 
page one of the Mercury. Two reasons for this are connected 
with the timing of the poll. In the previous September, the 
people had elected a new Federal parliament, which the 
Mercury suggested was the reason the people showed such a 
lack of interest in the State election.23 Also, the press were 
offering a detailed coverage of the Nuremburg war trials, an 
event of international importance. 
As happened in 1941, Cosgrove sought re-election based on 
his party's record whilst in office. In his policy speech, the 
Premier covered such areas as war-time activities, housing, 
and education. In the area of the HEC, he reminded the 
electors, it was a Labor government, under John Earle, that 
first supplied electrical energy to the people of Tasmania. It 
21 HEC annual report 1945-46. V&P, vol. cxxxv, 1946, paper 35. 
22Richard Davis, Eighty years' Labor(Hobart, 1983). p. 43. 
23IMPORTANCE OF ELECTION', M, 19 November 1946. 
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was the government's plan to supply electricity to every 
"accessible home in Tasmania", and the industries expected 
to come to this state in the next few years would require the 
development of another 150,000 horse power of energy. 24 In 
the area of the Legislative Council, it was the aim of the 
government to introduce a more democratic system of 
election to that chamber. He wished to remove the power 
without responsibility factor, and not the house itself, as 
was the belief espoused by his opponents. 25 
In its final editorial before the election, the Mercury summed 
up the campaign as being between the Labor government, 
with its experience and spotted history, and the Liberal 
opposition, which had enthusiasm and a new outlook. The 
government had "become stodgy, stubborn, and 
unprogressive" through its long stay on the Treasury 
benches. It concluded: 
Irrespective of what party is elected, the people 
should seek a well-balanced Assembly; they should 
know from experience that a strong and active 
Opposition is an essential if there is to be 
competence in government. 26 
Whilst there was a swing away from the government, it was 
insufficient for the newly formed Liberal party to win the 
election. Davis suggests the Hare-Clark system was a major 
cause for the return of the Cosgrove government. The Hare-
Clark system allows the loss of seats of many sitting 
• 
24Po1ey speech of the Premier of Tasmania  1946, p.24. 
25Policy speech..., pp.30-31; 'ATTACK ON LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL', M. 28 
October 1946. 
26 E REAL CHOICE TOMORROW, M, 22 November 1946. 
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members, whilst allowing the return of the government. This 
particular form of proportional representation, through its 
use of the single transferable vote, gives equal weight to all 
candidates, irrespective of their party grouping or experience 
In the legislature. 
No one can be given a safe seat... On election day, 
voters get an excellent choice between candidates, 
within parties as well as between them. They can 
expect their vote to be effective.27 
It has been suggested people vote for weak candidates 
because they believe it to be a foregone conclusion the 
stronger contenders will gain their seats. 28 In the case of the 
1946 election, only nine of the nineteen sitting Labor 
members retained their seats.28 When the house re-convened 
after the election, sixteen of the thirty members were sitting 
for the first time. Amongst the new Labor members elected 
were Eric Reece, W.A. (Bill) Neilson, both of whom went on 
to become Premiers, and Roy Fagan, one time President of 
the University Union, and henceforth loyal deputy of both 
Cosgrove and Reece." Neilson is also worth noting as the 
youngest• person to gain a seat in parliament. He turned 
twenty-one just before the election was called. Reece went 
into the cabinet, gaining the honorary portfolio of Housing, 
whilst Fagan became Attorney-Genera1. 31 On the Opposition 
bench, new members included Reg Wright, who moved to the 
Senate at the 1949 election, and Angus Bethune, a future 
27Bogey Musidlak, "Hare-Clark system reflects voter intent" (Letter), 
Australian 16 October 1992. 
28W.A. Townsley quoted in Terry Newman Hare-Clark in Tasmania 
(Hobart, 1992), p.252. 
29Davis, OD.cit., p.43. 
"Doug Lowe, The price of power(Melbourne, 1984), pp. 7-8. 
31Davis, 	 p. 44; V&P, vol. cocxviii, 1948. 
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premier. Notable amongst those who lost their seats were 
Henry Lane, Minister for Mines, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
William Taylor, Forests Minister. Longevity of service did not 
guarantee return of members. Three men with more than 
eighteen years service each lost their seats. John Ockerby 
had been a member since May 1928; Philip Kelly had been in 
the house for twenty-four years; and Sir Walter Lee, a former 
Premier, Father of the House32 , who had been, until 
Cosgrove's era, the longest serving Premier of Tasmania, and 
member for twenty-seven years. 
-There was a general wish for a change. - This- comes Out 'in 
Cosgrove's personal vote. After gaining a sizeable vote at the 
1941 election, support for the Premier went down by such an 
extent he gained less voter confidence than the Independent 
candidate Rex Townley. 33 One reason for this was the 
memory of the war. The electors had just gone through six 
years of hardship, which they could easily associate with the 
government. There would not be a better way of illustrating 
their frustration than by redirecting their preferences. If the 
Liberal party had been better prepared, they may have won 
the election. Another factor was the outcome of the Royal 
Commission into Forestry administration. The investigation 
proved a former member of the cabinet had accepted bribes, 
and had it not been for the decision of the Full Bench of 
Victoria, Tom D'Alton would have stood trial. 
32An honorary position given to the longest serving member of the house. 
The present Father of the House is Michael Polley. Speaker in the Field 
minority Government. 
33Davis. OD. cit.. pp. 39. 43. 
In 1947, there was a further attempt by the Cosgrove 
government to alter the Tasmanian constitution. In January, 
he sought from the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman, a Bill, to 
be introduced into the House of Assembly, similar to the 
British Parliamentary Act of 1911. 34 Osborne sent his 
minute to Cosgrove at the end of the month, and explained 
there were to be a number of new sections to the 
Constitution. The new section 35A was to allow ministers to 
address, and take part in debates in either house, although 
he wasnot to be given voting rights, and it was to allow only 
. y 	, • 
one minister to sit in the other house at any one time: and 
sections 44A-44E came, mutatis rnutandis, from the 1911 Act. 
Under the amendment, if the Legislative Council did not 
amend or pass a money bill 35 within one month, it could be 
sent to the Governor for Royal Assent. If any other public bill 
was passed in the House of Assembly, sent to the Legislative 
Council in three successive sessions, "whether of the same 
parliament or not", and not less than one month before the 
end of the session, it could be sent to the Governor to gain 
Royal Assent. The bill was not to be used for extending the 
34Memo from Cosgrove to Attorney-General. 21 January 1947. C.SO. 
107/7/47. AOT. 
35 In the bill. 'money bill' is defined as legislation covering any of "the 
imposition, repeal, remission, alteration, or regulation of taxation; the 
imposition, for the payment of debt or other financial purposes,of charges 
on the Consolidated Revenue, or on money provided by Parliament, or the 
variation or repeal of any such charges; supply; the appropriation, receipt, 
custody, issue, or audit of accounts of public money; the raising or 
guarentee of any loan or the repayment thereof; or subordinate matters 
incidental to those subjects or any of them. In this subsection the 
expressions 'taxation,' public money,' and 'loan' respectively do not 
Include any taxation, money, or loan raised by local authorities or bodies 
for local purposes." 
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parliamentary term beyond five years, nor for the abolition of 
the Legislative Council. The bill had to be endorsed by the 
Speaker "that the provisions of this section Re section 44131 
have been complied with." The certificate of the Speaker was 
to be conclusive, and could not be appealed against in a 
court of law. In the case of any Bills presented to the 
Governor under the provisions this Act, no mention was to 
be made of the Legislative Council in the wording of the 
enactment. Finally, the House of Assembly was not to lose 
any rights or privileges in the use of this Act. 36 Cosgrove 
introduced the Bill on 26 February, and it passed through all 
e` other stages on 13 March. It was sent to the Legislative" 
Council six days later. On 15 April, the Council decided, by a 
division of two to fourteen, against reading it a second time, 
and instead defered it for six months. 37 
The 1911 Parliament Act came about when the House of 
Lords rejected the 1909 budget of the Lloyd-George 
government. After initial opposition, the chamber passed the 
Bill after the Prime Minister threatened to have the necessary 
number of peers created to pass the legislation. The Act 
withdrew the power of the Lords to block supply. A money 
Bill becomes law one month after its passage through the 
House of Commons, even if it has not been passed by the 
Lords. 38 
36RG. Osborne to Cosgrove, 31 January 1947. C.S.O. 107/7/47. AOT; A 
Bill to Amend the Constitution Act 1934. 
37V&P, vol =owl, 1947, p. 57(LC). 
38Lord Longford A history of the House of Lords(London, 1988), pp. 149- 
152; Harry Street and Rodney Brazier(eds), Constitutional and, 
Administrative law, 4th ed.(Harmondsworth, 1983). pp. 306-307; Kenneth 
If this Bill had been passed by both houses, it is fair to 
believe the constitutional crisis which arose in 1948 would 
not have had the same effect. With the passage of this 
legislation, the Legislative Council would have lost the power 
it gained in 1924. The upper house was unlikely to hand over 
so much of its power. This would have been seen as a threat 
to their power of review. 
In its 1946-47 annual report, the HEC made its first mention 
of the use of migrant labour, to augment the local people and 
to help ethistrifot their darn. —AC thi's stage, the- HEC was 
only interested in migrants from Great Britain, but within 
twelve months this was to change. 39 The creation of future 
power schemes were facing difficulties by the lack of data, 
ranging from annual rainfall to ground surveys, and were 
further hampered by two floods. There was, however, the 
augmentation of Tarraleah, a 24.68 per cent increase in 
working costs, and an income for the year of £989,205, an 
increase of £59,230. The gross profit for the year was 
£635,170, which became a net profit of £54,197, a drop of 
£54,577 on the previous year. There were 3798 new customers 
connected, and again a majority, sixty-two per cent, were in 
the rural areas of Tasmania. This figure would have been 
higher except for a lack of material, a problem operating 
Mackenzie The English Parliament(Harmondsworth, 1962), pp. 185-186; 
W. Ivor Jennings The British constitution(Cambridge, 1966), pp. 104-106. 
39The use of migrant labour by the HEC is covered in more detail in a 
thesis by Eileen O'Brien. 
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world-wide. Work on the extension into the Tasman 
municipality was proceeding wel1. 40 
An issue the report covered but superficially was the lack of 
labour. In a memorandum to the Premier, A.W. Knight, 
recently appointed Commissioner, informed Cosgrove of the 
considerable turnover of staff. 
Such a turn-over of labour cannot be attributed to 
unsatisfactory conditions of employment at the 
dam. 
He believed they were leaving to work on new projects by the 
Hobart and Launceston City Councils, and the new 
Commonwealth Bank bujlciing at Hobart. The position,. he 
believed, might improve with the introduction of a bonus 
system. This idea received cabinet approval. It cannot be 
coincidental that in the following January the commission 
announced prefabricated houses were being built in 
Devonport for the its work at Tarraleah and Butlers Gorge, 
for the use of staff officers and key men. 41 
In the commission's next annual report, "the first nearly 
normal post-war year", the organisation reported it was still 
having supply problems, due to a lack of rainfall. The issue of 
migrants emerged again, and Polish migrants had joined the 
British, although under different conditions. Many of the 
figures given showed increases on the previous year. The peak 
load reached 197,400 horse power, an increase of nearly 
40HEC annual report 1946-47. V&P vol. C2COCVii, 1947, paper 27. 
41A.W. Knight to Cosgrove (memo), 23 April 1947; Cosgrove to Knight, 30 
April 1947. C.S.O. 135/34/47. AOT. 'Homes For H.E.C. Employees', M, 10 
January 1948. 
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thirty-seven thousand; income was £1,116,259: , there was a 
gross profit of £700,215; net profit was up by E23,821; 
working costs were £416,044, an improvement of 17.515 per 
cent: and there were 3939 new customers, 64.3 per cent in 
rural Tasmania. Whilst working costs had increased, the rate 
of interest to the Treasury had decreased, thereby allowing an 
addition of £42,000 to the contingency reserve fund. 42 
In April 1948, two months after he had regained the 
leadership of the party, Cosgrove sought to have a Bill 
written which would lead to the introduction of universal 
suffrage in LegislatiVenincil elect.i. 43 The - Premier 
introduced the Bill into the House of Assembly on 29 June, 
it passed all stages on 13 July, and went to the Legislative 
Council on the following day. 44 This Bill was greeted with 
disapproval from a majority of members of the upper house, 
and the editor of the Mercury. In essence, their argument 
against the widening of the franchise was identical: it would 
lead to the chamber becoming a party house, a mere rubber 
stamp of the Assembly, the loss of its position as a house of 
review, and, in the long-term, its abolition as set out in the 
Labor Party platform.45 This statement was made despite the 
failed attempt to have the party's platform changed the 
previous year. A motion was moved to have the wording of 
42HEC annual report 1947-48. V&P 1948, paper 37. 
43Cosgrove to Attorney-General, 5 April 1948. C.S.O. 107/35/48. AOT. 
44V & P vol. cxxxviii , 1948 
45'M.L.C. ATTACKS PREMIER ON FRANCHISE'. 6 April 1948: THE HOUSE 
OF REVIEW(Editorial), 7 April: 'REFERENDUM POSSIBLE ON FRANCHISE 
FOR STATE UPPER HOUSE', 'NO ACTION BY UPPER HOUSE TO 'THWART 
PEOPLE'S WILL', 'UPPER HOUSE FRANCHISE'(Editorial), 15 July 1948. 
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the party's policy changed from 'reform' to 'abolish'. 4 
Universal suffrage was eventually passed, but not for twenty 
years, and a study of the attempt in 1948 to broaden the 
franchise, clearly illustrates why it took so long to achieve 
this goal. 
In attempting to introduce a Bill to grant a wider franchise 
for the Legislative Council elections, Cosgrove sought to 
increase the democratisation of the chamber. He sought to 
allow all the people who voted in elections for the Assembly, 
to also be allowed to elect the members of the Council. In 
defehdliii 8-i1l, the Me-rairy snaestal- 
the franchise.. .is quite broad. Virtually all house- 
holders and servicemen have the vote. 47 
In his speech for the Bill's second reading, Tom D'Alton, the 
Leader of the Government in the Council, stated women 
constituted only sixteen thousand of the one hundred 
thousand voters in Council elections. Of these, twelve 
thousand five hundred owned properties, and only three 
thousand were working-class wives. With more than a little 
sarcasm, D'Alton stated "We call that a liberal franchise." 48 
The Bill was still in the chamber when the election for the 
Assembly was held. 
The arguments against the Bill led to unsubstantiated 
conclusions. In suggesting such a Bill would lead to a 
46Minutes of meetings of annual conference March 1943-March 1946. NS 
788/13. AOT. 
47THE HOUSE OF REVIEWIEditorial), M.  7 April 1948. 
48 '5EVERAL SPEAKERS IN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SUPPORT WIDER 
FRANCHISE FOR HOUSE', M.  21 July 1948. 
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clear-cut party system and review obviously would 
take place in caucus comprised of members of both 
Houses subscribing to the same party49 , 
Alexander Lillico, MLC for Mersey, feared it would become a 
party chamber, rather than remaining a house of review. In 
other states, where a wider franchise was evident, the upper 
house was still a house of review. 
Similarly, the editor of the Mercury suggested the extension 
of the franchise would lead it to becoming "another party 
Chamber" 50, although there is no indication of how this was 
to be achieved. The basis of this argument would appear to 
be based more on imagination and, fear ,of change,-than.on _ 
any realistic basis of the theory of electoral re-distribution. 
In their defence, H.S. Baker, the former leader of the 
Nationalist party, and by now entrenched in the Legislative 
Council seat of Queenborough, stated 
Lowering of rental qualifications, for instance, had 
given the humblest householder a vote. 51 
If this was true, the question then needs to be put: why did it 
take twenty-one years for universal suffrage to be introduced 
into Legislative Council elections? It would seem the 
Tasmanian upper house was obstinate to the last. 
The editor then went on to suggest the "proposal... strikes at 
the basis of Tasmania's parliamentary instrument." 52 This 
49-M.L.C. ATTACKS PREMIER ON FRANCHISE", M, 6 April 1948. 
50THE HOUSE OF REVIEW, M. 7 April 1948. 
51 'NO ACTION BY UPPER HOUSE TO THWART PEOPLE'S WILL', M, 15 
July 1948. 
52 'UPPER HOUSE FRANCHISE', M.  15 July 1948. 
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'basis' came from a limited franchise that allowed only a 
select element, usually male property owners, to cast a vote 
in Legislative Council elections. The Constitution Bill sought 
to do nothing more than to expand this base. 
Finally, the Mercury suggested the passing of this Bill would 
automatically lead to a government having a majority in both 
houses. 53 This is possible, although not guaranteed. There 
are examples of a governing party having control of both 
chambers of a parliament. For example, during the Prime 
Ministerships of John Curtin and Ben Chifley, the Labor 
- 
 
par ik controlled the •Senate 54: The 	biernTbehind the - 
Mercury's argument is that if this had occurred, maybe it was 
the will of the people. This does not seem to have occurred to 
the editor at the time he was writing his editorial. 
The fear of the Legislative Council ceasing to be a house of 
review can be understood, even though the arguments put 
forward are based on false premises. One reason for its 
existence is to review the legislation of the government. It is, 
in this sense, a safety valve, existing to ensure there is no 
legislation passed which might harm the people of Tasmania. 
Despite the broadening of its electoral base in 1969, the 
chamber remains a house of review. 
53 'UPPER HOUSE FRANCHISE', M.  15 July 1948. 
54L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labor party 1901- 1951(Sydney. 
1978), p.332. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ROYAL COMMISSION, TRIAL, 
AND THE 1948 ELECTION 
• 'AT no time has the Council sought to 
make or unmake Governments, dictate 
policy, or thwart the will of the people,' 
H.S. Baker MLC for Queenborough 
quoted in the Mercury, 15 July 1948 
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The year 1947 was to be a testing time for Robert Cosgrove, 
and to a lesser extent the Labour Government. In 
November, the Leader of the Opposition, Neil Campbell, 
Informed the House of Assembly that a road operator had 
made certain allegations against the Premier. The operator, 
James Thomas Sullivan, alleged he and three other 
operators had paid Cosgrove £5,400 over a three year 
period, to ensure the government did not continue with 
their plan to nationalise road transport operations. It is 
significant that Sullivan, and the other three operators, 
believed the money was going into the funds of the A.L.P., 
whereas point 2(b) of the letters patent' suggested the 
possibility Cosgrove had kept the money for himself. 2 The 
result of this allegation was a Royal Commission, presided 
by Mr Justice Reed of the Supreme Court of South Australia, 
who found that Cosgrove had an answerable case. Cosgrove 
resigned the premiership on 19 December 1947, with the 
understanding he would regain the position immediately 
the jury had established his innocence. Subsequently there 
was a trial lasting nearly two weeks, at which the former 
Premier was found not guilty of all fourteen counts of 
bribery. Within six months of Cosgrove's acquittal, and 
subsequent re-election to the leadership of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, his Government won the 
election caused by the Legislative Council's refusal to allow 
the Supply Bill to pass through the house. 
'Grants by the Crown of lands, franchises, offices, etc., contained in 
the charters or instruments not sealed up but exposed to view with the 
Great Seal pendant at the bottom, and usually addressed to all the 
subjects of the realm." P.G. Osborn, A concise dictionary 5th 
td..(London, 1964), p. 129 
2Report of the..., V 8t P vol C200CiX, 1948, 
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Governments, both in Britain and Australia, have often made 
use of Royal Commissions. In the forty years since the end 
of the Second World War, there have been at least thirty-five 
Royal Commissions set up in Britain. 3 This compares with 
the ninety-three in Australia during the period 1945-1980. 4 
According to KC Wheare, a Royal Commission is used when 
the matter being investigated is of great importance, is of 
the public interest, or there is no other body that is capable 
of investigating the issue. In essence, it is a committee of 
inquiry, set up to investigate a matter of great seriousness. 
Wheare also notes it is more important than a departmental 
enquiry since "its members are appointed by the Queen". 3 
A.P. Herbert has put up the contrary view that "a Royal 
Commission is generally appointed, not so much for digging 
3Leon Brittain, Home Secretary, to Tim Eggar, MP, 25 January 1985, 
held in House of Commons Library. House of Commons Hansard, 22 
April 1985, col. 350. In his letter. Brittain points out not all warrants 
setting up Royal Commissions were signed by the Home Secretary of the 
day; some commissions did not write up a report; and thirdly not all the 
records are held by the Home Office. 
4Commonwealth 19 
Tasmania 	6 
New South Wales 19 
Victoria 16 
Western Australia 40 
South Australia 	19 
Queensland 
Total 	 9_a 
Note: the figure for Western Australia is for the period 1945-70, and 
includes a number of Honorary Royal Commissions. 
D.H. Borchardt, Checklist of Royal Commissions. Select Committees of 
Darliament. and Boards of Inquiry (7 parts) (Sydney, 1960-86; 
Bundoora, 1975,78); Elmar Zalums, A bibliography of South Australian 
Royal Commissions. Select Committees of Parliament. and Boards of 
Inquiry 1857-1970 (Bedford Park, 1975); Elmar Zalums and Helen 
Stafford A bibliography of Western Australian Royal Commissions. Select 
Committees of Parliament.  And Boards of Inquiry 1870-1979 (Bedford 
Park, 1980). 
5K.C. Wheare, Government by committee (London. 1955),p. 69. 
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up the truth, as for digging it in"6 . Dibelius, among others, 
would agree with this proposition. In his book England, he 
suggested the originator of the commission may influence 
the direction it takes since he will know the views of the 
appointees. 7 Similarly, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, possibly 
the two most famous of the Fabians, stated: "impartial 
party'... means merely that the selector and the selected 
agree in their bias". 8 It is possible to suggest Royal 
Commissions are effective since there have been so many 
this century. This argument may also be used to justify the 
opposite view-instigate a Royal Commission if an unsightly 
mistake has been made. 
A Royal Commission usually deals with a specific issue, and 
once the report is submitted to the Queen (or the Vice-
Regal representative in the case of Australia 9 ), it will be 
disbanded. There is, of course, the exception to every rule. 
Annual reports are submitted by the Royal Commissions on 
Environmental Pollution, Historical Monuments, Ancient 
Monuments, and Historical Manuscripts, as well as the 
Royal Fine Arts Commission in Britain. 19 They can be 
equated to our standing committees. 
6quoted in Peter Hennessy, Whitehall(London, 1989), p.576. 
7W. Dibelius,  ngland(London, 1930), p.254, quoted in Social research 
and Royal Commissions, edited by Martin Bulmer(London, 1980), p.3. 
8Sidney and Beatrice Webb, quoted in Social research and Royal  
Commissions, edited by Martin Bulmer (London, 1980), p.3. 
9Under section 1B of the Royal Commissions Act(Cwth) 1902-1933, 
only the King or the Governor-General may appoint a Royal 
Commissioner. In Tasmania, this can be done by the Governor. 
19Hennessy, 142,_.t., p.575; Leon Brittain to Tim Eggar, 25 January 
1985. 
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The next stage is to appoint the Royal Commissioner. Lords 
Benson and Rothschild, in • their memorial to Royal 
Commissions, make the suggestion the appointee should 
have experience, a good intellect, integrity, capacity and "a 
moderate political outlook." Equally, the appointee must 
not have an intense and preconceived view, or membership 
of an organisation or pressure group, even if there is no 
connection with that group, directly or indirectly, with the 
commission. 11 These criteria are important, for without 
them, there is no guarantee the final report will possess the 
necessary impartiality. 
Royal Commissions are partly covered by the Royal 
Commissions Act. This act includes: the power to send for 
witnesses and documents, the power to examine upon oath, 
a penalty for failing to attend or produce documents, a 
penalty for refusing to be sworn or to give evidence, the 
protection of the commissioner, and allowances for 
witnesses. 12  In Tasmania, the creation of a Royal 
Commission falls within the prerogative of the Governor 
representing the Crown, and the operating guidelines are 
found within the Evidence Act (Tas) 1910. 
In the Royal Commission into certain allegations against 
Robert Cosgrove, a Bill was brought before the House of 
Assembly on 25 November 1947 by the Attorney-General, 
• 
"Lord Benson and Lord Rothschild. "Royal Commissions: a memorial". 
Public Administration Vol. 60. Autumn 1982. pp. 341-2. 
12Royal Commissions Act(Cwth) 1902-1933 
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Roy Fagan. 13 The main parts of this act were the allowance 
of legal representation 14 , and the sum of £5,000 out of 
consolidated revenue for the expenses that were to come 
out of the commission. 15 
Theoretically, it would have been possible to have appointed 
a Tasmanian Judge to oversee the running of the 
commission. As the majority of such investigations are 
presided over by people who are in, or have been, members 
of the legal profession (either judges or barristers), there 
were many people from which to choose a commissioner. 
One option, for example, might have been to choose the 
Chief Justice, Sir John Morris, who was to later hear the 
trial of Robert Cosgrove. Sir John, in a letter to the 
Attorney-General, gave two reasons for not recommending a 
local justice as Royal Commissioner. Firstly, to retain "the 
confidence of the people", he could not allow a local judge 
to oversee a commission that involved "political 
controversy". Secondly, 
"proceedings by Royal Commission are quite 
inappropriate in cases where criminality is 
alleged. If any case exists upon which a jury 
might reasonably convict, a method prescribed 
by law for its investigation is a trial by jury 
conducted upon the well recognized principles 
of the criminal law." 1 6 
13The Royal Commission Expenses  Aa(Tas) was introduced into the 
House of Assembly on 25 November 1947, had passed all its stages in 
both houses by the following day (26 November), and received Royal 
Assent on 28 November, entering the statute books as 11Geo. VI c.66. 'V 
&I vol. cmocvi, pp.274, 280, 283, 300. 
14s.3. 
15s.4. 
16v & p.  (1947), p.239(HA). 
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The presiding position was granted to an interstate judge-
Mr Justice Reed of the Supreme Court of South Australia. 
Geoffrey Sandford Reed(1892-1970) attended Prince Alfred 
College and Adelaide University, called to the bar in 1914, 
and made a KC in 1937. He held various legal and academic 
positions, until he became a Justice of the Supreme Court of 
South Australia in 1943. He gained a knighthood in 1953, 
and retired nine years later. 17 
Reed came to the position a very experienced legal 
practitioner. He had been a member of the legal fraternity 
for thirty-three years, a KC for a decade and a member of 
the Supreme Court of South Australia since 1943. As for his 
intellect, this can only be surmised. Having been a barrister 
for more than three decades, it may be presumed that he 
had some intellect. The same may be said for integrity and 
capacity. Without the assistance of an authorised biography, 
it is not possible to gain an insight into the past life of 
Geoffrey Reed, and as such it is equally impossible to fully 
measure him against the criteria suggested by Lords Benson 
and Rothschild. From the available information concerning 
his attributes, there is no reason why his appointment as 
Royal Commissioner should be questioned. 
To ensure the careful operation of a Royal Commission was 
one matter; but when the government was forced to deal 
with allegations against its own leader, who declined to step 
down during the preparation and operation of the Royal 
17 Who was who, volume 6, pp. xxxviii-)ocxix. 
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Commission, it had to ensure justice was not only seen to be 
done, but was being carried out. For this reason, it was 
appropriate to appoint an interstate Justice. 
Whilst the Royal Commission was not a trial in its strict 
meaning, the character of Robert Cosgrove was to be 
investigated throughout its duration. To have a Royal 
Commissioner who was not, or had not been a judge may 
have led to the possibility of the Royal Commission not 
fulfilling its terms of reference. 
The Royal Commission began its sessions on 2 December 
1947, with Mr Justice Reed in the chair. Interstate counsel 
were hired to represent Robert Cosgrove and James 
Sullivan-E.R.T Reynolds KC, and R.V. Monahan KC 
respectively, although the instructing solicitors (R.H. 
Cogswell and W.E. Cox) were Tasmanians. The Royal 
Commission lasted until 9 December when it was finished 
abruptly. The report was handed to the Governor, Sir 
Thomas Binney, two days later. 18 
The basis of the Royal Commission was whether Sullivan, 
representing himself and three other road transport 
operators, offered Cosgrove £5,400 to ensure the Labour 
Government did not continue with their policy of 
nationalising road transport; whether Cosgrove accepted 
this money; and if he did, whether it went into the Labour 
18 'Report of the Royal Commissioner upon certain allegations of 
improper payments to the Honourable the Premier in relation to State 
road transport policy' V&P vol. cxxxix, 1948, p.1. 
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Party funds as the four operators believed to be the case, or 
whether Cosgrove kept the money for himself. There is 
evidence to suggest Guy, Fry, and Cook gave Sullivan 
money. 19 If Sullivan did not offer the money to Cosgrove, 
then did he keep it for himself; in which case, is this why 
he went to Neil Campbell? Would this have been a good way 
of making sure he was not prosecuted? If he did keep the 
money for himself, then he could claim he had given it to 
the Premier, and with the assistance of the opposition 
party, he may have succeeded. The final destination of the 
money is unknown, although Cosgrove's counsel suggested 
Sullivan spent it betting on horses. 20 On the other hand, if 
he had offered the money to Cosgrove, and the Premier had 
accepted it, there was still the question whether the money 
went into the party funds. If it had, then it may have been 
possible to justify it as a party donation, and as such, it 
would have been legitimate. If it affected the party's 
policies, then the issue entered the realm of corruption. 
Another option was that Robert Cosgrove may well have 
accepted the money from Sullivan, and kept it for his own 
use. If he had been caught doing this, it would not matter 
how popular he may have been, his political career would 
have come to an end, and he would have been sent to gaol. 
The Royal Commission uncovered some evidence that 
damaged Cosgrove. The first of these was the destination of 
the payments. From the very beginning, the four operators 
• 
19"K.C. QUERIES DESTINATION OF GIFT MONEY",E , 4 December 
1947 C.S.O. 164/2/47 AOT 
"Scott Bennett, "Labor under attack 1947-1948, THRAPP Vol 33, 
No.2, June 1986, p.70. 
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maintained the view the money they were handing over to 
the Premier was going into the accounts of the A.L.P. 21 This 
was significant since the location of the money would 
delineate between a bribe and a party donation. If the 
money went into the private account of Cosgrove, then it 
may be classified as a bribe. If, however, the money went 
into the coffers of the organisation, and it did not cause a 
change in the party's policies, then it was simply a legal 
donation. If it could be proven, without any doubts, 
Cosgrove not only accepted the money and retained it for 
his own purposes, then he would be guilty of the allegations 
brought by Sullivan. 
There was evidence given on the method of the alleged 
payment to the Premier. Sullivan and Charles Guy were to 
pay 1.250 each, whilst both Harold Fry and Herbert Cook 
would pay £200, making a total of £900, to be paid half-
yearly. 22 There was no statement as to how long the 
payments were to be made; all that is known is they had 
allegedly begun in June 1944. From evidence given before 
the Royal Commission, it appears Sullivan believed 
donations to the A.L.P. would lead to a change in transport 
policy, and since all four operators would be affected by 
nationalisation, it would have been worth their while to 
attempt to have the policy changed. 23 
21 "ANSETT TOUR LICENCES 'SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED' - , 
M, 3 December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47 AOT. 
22"COMMISSION TOLD PREMIER GIVEN MONEY FOR A.L.P. - , 
December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47 AOT. 
23-ALLEGED DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FUNDS OF POLITICAL PARTIES", 
E. 3 December 1947 C.S.O. 164/2/47; "COMMISSION'S POLICY", E, 5 
December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47 AOT. 
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It appears unlikely that the payments were so large. It 
would have been far more sensible for Sullivan, had he paid 
Cosgrove the £5,400, to have arranged smaller and more 
regular instalments. This would have made it very easy to 
hide the payments; and it would have kept Robert Cosgrove 
on Sullivan's 'pay-roll', thereby not allowing the Premier to 
forget his obligation. For example, had Sullivan paid 
Cosgrove £70 per fortnight, the Premier would have gained 
the same amount of money in the end, and Sullivan would 
conceivably have gained more control over the Premier. 
A further item that damaged Cosgrove was the matter of a 
special party account. Until its existence was disclosed at 
the Royal Commission, even the State Secretary, Ernest 
West, had no knowledge of its existence.24 The secrecy of 
the fund's existence was damaging. The secretary of the 
party was a position of trust, and therefore, it would have 
been expected he should be informed how the money given 
to the party is spent and invested. The implication was 
Cosgrove, having kept the fund a secret from West, hid 
donations in it that he wanted kept secret. After the trial, 
the opposition moved a motion, calling on the government 
to table these books. The motion was defeated along party 
lines. 
24-A.L.P. OFFICERS SAY NO DONATIONS FROM ROAD OPERATORS", M. 
6 December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47: "FORMER SECRETARY OF A.L.P. 
SPEAKS OF PARTY ACCOUNTS", K. 6 December 1947 C.S.O. 164/2/47 
AOT. 
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Cosgrove's reaction to Sullivan's offer, in October 1947, of 
£3,000 also came under investigation. Under cross-
examination by Cox, Brooker informed the court Cosgrove 
had told members of the Executive Council he had not 
thrown Sullivan out of his office. 25 It would seem unusual for 
a man of such high office not to have acted in a more 
insulted manner. At the trial, in recounting this episode, 
Cosgrove informed the Chief Justice he "went to the door 
and showed him out." 26 
The evidence in Cosgrove's favour is substantial. First, there 
was a lack of any records of the alleged payments made by 
Sullivan. This lack could work either way, though Cosgrove 
was hardly likely to leave any traces of any bribes. It was left 
to an accountant, Allan Hewer, to search out any money that 
could not be easily accounted.27 He failed to find any 
records of the alleged payments, even after looking into 
Cosgrove's savings accounts. 28 
25-KNOWLEDGE OF PARTY FUND", E, 9 December 1947 C.S.O. 
164/2/47 AOT. In so doing, Cox was exercising his right, as a solicitor, 
to cross-examine a witness. 
26 transcript of the trial, 17 February 1948 S.G.D./27/39/221 AOT. 	• 
27-NO RECORD OF GIFT TO PARTY'', M, 5 December 1947 C.S.O. 
164/1/47 AOT. 




Secondly, there was Cosgrove's public support for 
nationalisation of transport. In evidence before the 
commission, Ernest West stated the Premier had come out in 
favour of nationalisation of main routes at party conferences 
held in March of 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946. 29 It is hard to 
believe he would put in train circumstances repairing him to 
reverse clearly-stated opinions. Sullivan alleged the first 
payment was made in December 1944, which he also stated 
was his first meeting with Cosgrove. Sullivan must have been 
taking a risk in offering money to Cosgrove when the Premier 
• was so much in favour of nationalisation. The idea behind 
the offer was-tc ip,duce the Premier-to help Sullivan - 'and tht 
other three operators by having the policy of nationalisation 
removed from the party's platform. Cosgrove had also been 
reported in the Mercury as supporting nationalising the major 
transport routes in Tasmania, thereby leaving little doubt as 
to his intentions. It is hard to believe Sullivan could have 
been so foolish as to expect the Premier to change his mind 
so quickly. If Sullivan had the money refered to in the 
charges, and if the other three operators gave him their 
shares, it is difficult to suggest who were the more foolish-
Sullivan or the three other operators. It is hard to envisage 
anybody handing over so much money without any guarantee 
of success. 
Thirdly, Fry stated he made payments of £200 to Sullivan in 
29"A.L.P.OFFICERS SAY NO DONATIONS FROM ROAD OPERATORS", M, 6 
December 1947; "PURCHASED £672 CAR", M, 9 December 1947 C.S.O. 
164/1/47 AOT. 
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and Fry's first instalment to Sullivan, unless Sullivan did not 
pay any money whatsoever to Cosgrove? 
The commission rose on 9 December, having sat for only 
five days. There was no stipulation when the commission 
was to rise, provided the Governor received the report by 
20 December. 30 The commissioner did not wish this 
decision to be seen as a sign of Cosgrove being guilty. He 
said if the Premier had been called to give evidence under 
the existing circumstances, it may have prejudiced him, 
and may have brought about a statement of innocence, or 
guilt, by methods other than his constitutional right of trial 
by jury. In accordance with this principle, an indictment 
was to be filed against the Premier, whilst the four road 
operators were to be given pardons so as not to incriminate 
themselves.31 
Cosgrove was indicted under the 'ex officio' method. This 
came under the condition set out under section 310 of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code. There was a difference in this 
indictment, in that there had not been a previous 
committal proceeding before a magistrate. In such cases, 
the magistrate would decide whether there was "a strong 
30Report of the Royal Commissioner...', p. 
31 "INDICTMENT TO BE FILED AGAINST MR COSGROVE", At io 
December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47; "PREMIER TO BE INDICTED", E. 10 
December 1947 C.S.O. 164/2/47; C.S.O. 162/4/48 AOT. The right of 
witnesses not to incriminate themselves comes under section 6DD of 
the Royal Commissions Act(Cwth) 1902-1933 
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or probable presumption of guilt against the person, 
sufficient to commit him for trial." 32 
Robert Cosgrove resigned the office of Premier on 19 
December 1947, and was replaced, as expected, by his 
deputy, Edward Brooker. 33 Following the conclusion of the 
commission, the precise timing of his resignation was the 
subject of much media speculation34 , and continued for the 
following week. 35 
In January 1948, an indictment was processed, charging 
Robert Cosgrove with fourteen counts of bribery, 
corruption, and conspiracy. 36 The trial began at the 
Supreme Court before Chief Justice Morris on 10 February, 
and lasted for nearly two weeks. For the trial, Robert 
Cosgrove again sought counsel from interstate, this time in 
the form of Mr R.R. Sholl, KC, of Melbourne, whilst W.E. Cox 
of Hobart and G.H. Crawford of Launceston were instructing 
32 This information was gained from a letter to the author from Mr F.M. 
Neasey, a former justice of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, 11 
November 1992. 
33V & P Vol. cmccviii, 1948, p.2(HA). 
34-STATE CRISIS LOOMS", M. 10 December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47 
AOT. 
35-POLITICAL CRISIS EXPECTED THIS MORNING". M, 12 December 
1947; "RESIGNATION OF PREMIER NOT TENDERED YET', M.  13 . 
December 1947; "MR BROOKER TO FOLLOW PREMIER AS STATE 
LEADER", M, 16 December 1947; "REFUSES TO RETAIN 
LEADERSHIP", "STOP-GAP GOVERNMENT LIKELY", M.  17 December 
1947, C.S.O. 164/1/47; "State Political Problem", E. 15 December 1947 
C.S.O. 164/2/47 AOT. 
36Charge 1 came under s71 of Criminal Code for accepting £900 for 
himself from Sullivan in December 1944 to change transport policy; 
charges 2-6, also under s71 of Criminal Code, for payments of £900 in 
July and December 1945, June and December 1946, and June 1947; 
charges 7-12. the first 6 under s83 of the Criminal Code, for receiving 
£900 in December 1944, July and December 1945. June and December 
1946, June 1947 for similar purposes; charge 13 for conspiring with 
Sullivan for the payment of £1800 per year; charge 14 for conspiring 
with Sullivan. The final two counts came under s297 of the CI:Ulnal 
Code. R. v. Cosgrove; S.G.D./27/221; "14 COUNTS IN COSGROVE 
INDICTMENT', M.  22 January 1948 C.S.O. 164/1/48 AOT. 
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solicitors. The Crown case was led by the Solicitor-General, 
M.G. Gibson, KC, with H.J. Solomon. The Mercury made the 
unusual disclosure of naming the jury. 37 
As with the case in the Royal Commission, the chief source 
of evidence was Sullivan, who retained his story as to the 
destination of the £5,400 allegedly given to Cosgrove. This 
should not be at all surprising, as any alteration to his story 
at this stage would have meant disaster. Any credibility he 
may have obtained during the Royal Commission would have 
been lost. 
The case for Robert Cosgrove rested on the discrediting of 
the evidence of Sullivan, or the man himself. Before this was 
undertaken, Sholl attempted to have a separate trial called 
for the two conspiracy charges. He applied under section 
326(3) of the Criminal Code. The Chief Justice replied that 
"the justice of the case as a whole, demanded that he should 
not grant the application." 38 
After Cosgrove's plea of not guilty, Sholl sought an end to 
the trial due to the lack of a conspirator. He argued the 
pardon granted to Sullivan meant he could no longer be 
37 "PERSONALITIES IN THE CASE", a, 11 February 1948 C.S.O. 
164/1/48 AOT. This is a curious act. It is posible the names were 
published by someone at the Mercury who feared Cosgrove was guilty as 
charged. By publishing the names of the members of the jury, the 
followers of Cosgrove could 'help' him be proven innocent. The 
publication of the names would hace to be sanctioned by a senior 
member of the editorial committee, otherwise they would not have been 
In the finished copy of the newspaper. This would suggest the persdn 
who submitted them for publication must have been someone connected 
with the proprietor, the editor, or both of these people. 
38"SEPARATE TRIAL IN COSGROVE CASE REFUSED", M,7 February 
1948 C.S.O. 164/1/48 AOT. 
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counted as a conspirator, therefore there could no longer 
be a conspiracy charge levelled at Cosgrove. 39 On 
dismissing this plea, the Chief Justice said 
a pardon contained no statement of 
fact. The provisions for libel action by 
a pardoned person accused of a 
crime were made to prevent 
reproach to that person. 49 
Sholl also sought to have the evidence brought out in the 
Royal Commission declared inadmissible as evidence in the 
trial. He argued it contravened section 21(4) of the 
Tasmanian Evidence Act on the ground it was inconsistent 
with sub-sections 2 and 3• 41 Sholl argued against the 
admissability of any evidence brought before the 
commission being used at the trial. Marcus Gibson, for the 
Crown, argued against it, stating "The basic fallacy of the 
contention of the accused is that a pardon is equivalent to 
an acquittal."42 In this argument, the Crown was successful. 
The basis of Cosgrove's defence was the matter of the 
interviews. In his opening remarks, Sholl informed the 
39Minutes pp. 165-6, Hay v. Justices of Tower of London, pueen's Bench  
Division vol. 240, 561 at 564-5; Regina v. Alley Victorian Law Report 
Vol 12, 1886. PP.  13- ; R v. Manning Queen's Bench Division vol.12, pp. 
241-; Rex v. Plummer King's Bench, Vol. 2, 1902, pp. 343, 347; Rex v. 
Cook 5 Bar Pr 538 (1820), sec 21(4) of the Evidence Act, sec 355 and 
398 of Criminal Code, and sec 8 of Criminal Code Act. He also referred 
to Gatley on Libel and slander. 
49-Counsel Claims pardons Annul Charges", M.  11 February 1948 C.S.O. 
164/1/48 AOT. 
41-ACCOMPLICE HELD NECESSARY FOR BRIBE CHARGES", M. 11 
February 1948 C.S.O. 164/1/48 AOT; R v. Cosgrove, pp.102,104. 
42R. v. Cosgrove. p.104; Beachie v. Rex Cox's Criminal Cases (Privy 
Council), vol. 25, 1915, p.217, Regina v. Dean New South Wales Report 
vol. 17, 1896. p35, R v. Daguid Cox's Criminal Cases, vol. 21, p.200 & 
Law Journal Reports (King's Bench)  vol.75, p. 470. Regina v. Alley 
Victorian Law Report. vol.12, 1886, p. 13; ss 35 and 398 of the Criminal 
Code, s 8 of the Criminal Code Act, s 21(4) of the Evidence Act. Hales 
Pleas of the Crown 2nd vol. p.78;_Prerogatives of - the Crown,1820. 
p.102.(repr.) 
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court the former Premier was going to state that no 
Interview between himself and Sullivan occured before the 
end of 1945. This threw into doubt Sullivan's claim of a first 
meeting in December 1944. Cosgrove did admit seeing 
Sullivan in March 1947, but this was over the matter of a 
general hire automobile licence: and again in the following 
May, this time over newspaper freight tax. Furthermore, 
the alleged meeting on 27 June 1947, the day the last of 
the alleged payments was made, did not occur. According 
to Cosgrove, the final meeting between himself and Sullivan 
was on 28 October 1947 when the latter offered him 
£3,000, a meeting Sullivan denied.43 
Before the trial began, Cosgrove's counsel informed the 
Solicitor-General they were willing to admit to four points. 
Firstly, Cosgrove was a member of parliament during the 
period 1939-47. Secondly, they accepted "The evidence of 
the following witnesses whose proofs you have supplied to 
us, provided that such evidence is submitted in written 
form by reading and putting in the proofs-" Nancy Young, 
Ada Dixon, Eric Balfe, Quentin McDougall, Arthur Connolly, 
Vivien McLean ("subject to the witness Hay identifying the 
document referred to in paragraph 3 of her proof'), Ernest 
Pretyman (so long as they may see his exhibit), and Charles 
43 "Cosgrove To Deny Allegations", M.  17 February 1948 C.S.O. 
164/1/48 AOT. Sullivan had alleged his final meeting with Cosgrove was 
in the latter's room at the Brisbane Hotel, Launceston. Cosgrove's denial 
of this interview is aided by the evidence brought before the Royal 
Commission by the hotel porter, who denied taking Sullivan up to the 
Premier's room. "DENIES HE TOOK SULLIVAN TO PREMIER'S 
ROOM", M, 6 December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47; "EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING HOTEL visa- , E, 6 December 1947 C.S.O. 164/2/47 
AOT. 
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Murphy. 44 This material was deemed non controversial, and 
dealt largely with the purchase, by Cosgrove, of a car for 
£675. Thirdly, Cosgrove placed a telephone call through to 
Sullivan's office in Launceston on 6 November 1947, at 8.56 
a.m., without talking to Sullivan, and Sullivan had 
telephoned Cosgrove's Hobart home at 6.30 p.m. on 7 
November 1947. Finally, the press statements in the 
Mercury on 21, 24, and 27 July 1947 were accurate "in so 
far as they purport to report statements made by Mr. 
Cosgrove for publication." 45 Clearly his counsel was not 
going to admit to too many points, or else they would be 
handing over to the prosecuting counsel ammunition that 
would be returned once the trial began. 
The trial concluded on 21 February 1948; with Cosgrove 
being found not guilty on all fourteen counts. In his 
summing up, Sir John placed significant emphasis on the 
reliability of Sullivan's evidence. He cautioned the members 
of the jury not to deliberate solely on the evidence of 
Sullivan. He noted the testimony of one accomplice was 
dubious; and that if the other three operators were his 
44Balfe was a journalist on the literary staff at the Mercury, and 
government roundsman; Murphy had been Clerk of the House of 
Assembly since 1941; Pretyman was an accountant with the Hobart 
Savings Bank; Young had been, during October 1946, a cashier in the 
office of Perpetual Insurance and Securities Ltd, which was associated 
with City Motors, where Cosgrove had purchased a car; Dixon was an 
employee of City Motors Pty. Ltd.; Arthur Hay was State Secretary of the 
General Division of the Tasmanian Transport Association; McDougall was 
a public accountant, and Secretary of the Tasmanian Road Transport 
Association; and, Connolly was secretary and manager of the Swansea 
and East Coast Motor Co. Pty. Ltd. 
45 Dobson, Mitchell, and Allport to Solicitor-General, 11 February 1948. 
S.G.D./27/39/221 AOT. In the copy held with the papers from the trial, 
a single line is drawn through the names Eric Balfe, Quentin McDougall, 
and Arthur Connolly. 
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associates, then the jury should carefully consider the 
statements of Cosgrove's accusers. 46 
Immediately following the trial, Robert Cosgrove resumed 
his position of Premier of Tasmania. Rumours to the effect 
there was to be a forced election were heard even before 
the trial had begun. A story to this effect was published in 
the Mercury in December 1947,47  and a similar article 
appeared in the Voice, the Labor Party weekly, in the 
following March. 48 The Legislative Council had found a 
possible reason to use their prerogative power of blocking 
supply, thereby sending the government to the people. 
John Madden introduced the 1948-49 budget into the 
House of Assembly on 6 July 1948.49  It passed all three 
readings, and was sent to the Legislative Council. As 
expected, they refused supply, and despite attempts to find 
a compromise, the House of Assembly was dissolved 60 , and 
the government went to the people. In a statement to the 
House of Assembly, the President of the Legislative Council, 
Sir Rupert Shoobridge, justified his chamber's decision not 
to pass the budget, in its form as presented, on three 
grounds. First, the Members of the Legislative Council 
suggested allowing only "two months supply with a view to 
an election" based on the government's lack of moral 
46"COSGROVE APPLAUDED BY CROWD AFTER JURY RETURNS NOT 
GUILTY VERDICT ON CRIMINAL CHARGES", "'Acceptance Of Money 
Would Be Wrong-, M.  23 February 1948 C.S.O. 164/1/48 AOT. 
47 "DISSOLUTION NOT PROBABLE BEFORE FEBRUARY", M . 1.1 
December 1947 C.S.O. 164/1/47 AOT. 
48"The Plain Truth", V, 20 March 1948. 
49 V & P vol. cxxxviii, 1948, p.81(HA) 
50 V & P. vol. 000nriii, 1948, p.133(HA) 
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integrity. Secondly, the council suggested the government 
no longer had the confidence of the people, and therefore 
the government should return to gain another mandate. 
Thirdly, the council believed it had the right to reject 
'honey bills under sections 44-45 of the Constitution Act of 
1926. 51 In making this statement, Sir Rupert had the 
support of the Mercury. 52 
The Speaker of the House of Assembly, Peter Pike, refuted 
these arguments. First, the Legislative Council did not have 
the power to amend money bills. Secondly, the 
amendments suggested would force the government to the 
people, whereas the "Government holds the confidence of 
the House of Assembly." Thirdly, the actions of the 
Legislative Council were unconstitutional. Pike reminded 
Shoobridge upper houses had not, by tradition, the power 
to reject "a pure money Bill." 53 As such, it is not written 
down in the statute books, but in a place where traditions 
are kept alive, it would be nearly as powerful. 54 There was 
an attempt to compromise via a Managers' Conference 55 , as 
is the usual practice when problems arise over supply 
legislation, but this failed. 
51 V & P, vol. cxxxviii, 1948, p.111(HA). 
52 'THE PEOPLE SHOULD SAY'(Editorial), 1 July 1948; 
'PARLIAMENTARY CRISIS'(Editorial), 9 July 1948. 
53This was true insofar as it covered the House of Lords. However under 
section 53 of the Commonwealth Constitution, the Senate can reject 
supply. David Lidderdale(ed), Erskine May's treatise on the law, 
privilege, proceedings and usage of parliament, 19th edition(London, 
1976), pp.567-8. 806-10; Commonwealth Constitution. section 53; J.R. 
Odgers, Australian Senate practice(Canberra, 1991), p.565. 
54 V & P, vol.cxxxviii, 1948, p.101(HA) 
55 V &  E. vol. comiii, 1948, p. 115(HA), Royal Commission into the 
Constitution Act 1934 Tasmania, p. 13. 
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The house in possession of the Bill may convene a 
Managers' conference, and it has also the right to set the 
objectives. There will be an equal number of representatives 
from each chamber, although this is not to be greater than 
four. Both houses nominate the managers, or they are 
elected by a ballot. 56 The other house fixes the time and 
place of the meeting, it is to be held when either or both 
houses are sitting, and any business being undertaken at the 
time is to be suspended for the duration of the conference. 
If the conference is held during an adjournment, they may 
sit on any day, except Sunday, and for a duration of no 
more than ten days. The conference may adjourn from time 
to time, so long as the day it resumes its proceedings is not 
a sitting day of either house. 57 The chairman of the house 
that called the conference only has deliberative powers, and 
may not have a casting vote. 58 The managers are to confer 
freely, and are encouraged to compromise. 58 The 
recommendations of the conference go back to both houses 
through the chairman of the house that called the meeting, 
who informs the other house the conference's position60 , or 
the managers inform their houses no compromise was 
possible. 
In viewing the constitutional crisis of 1948, what can be 
seen is a case of what should happen as against what 
occurred. Under ideal conditions, the Legislative Council 
56HASO 410-12, LCSO 300-2 
57HASO 413-4, LCSO 303-4 
58HASO 415, LCSO 305 
59HASO 416, LCSO 306 
80HASO 417-8, LCSO 307-8 
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should have passed the supply bill. Under section 42(2) of 
the Tasmanian Constitution, the Legislative Council has the 
power to amend non-money bills, whilst section 43 allows 
the upper house to return bills, and request amendments 
be made. Under section 42(1), "The Council may not 
amend a Bill for an Appropriation Act, a Bill for an Income 
Tax rating Act, or a Bill for a Land Tax Rating Act." The 
Legislative Council could not amend the Bill, to do so would 
be to act contrary to the provisions of this sub-section. 
Section 44 allowed them to reject all Bills that are tabled. 
The power of the Legislative Council in blocking supply, can 
be clearly shown, by comparing its power with the other 
five upper houses in Australia. In New South Wales, if a 
money Bill is not passed within one month, or if an 
unacceptable amendment is offered, it can be sent to the 
Governor for Royal Assent. In Victoria, if the Legislative 
Council rejects a Bill within two months, the Governor may 
dissolve the Legislative Assembly, but only if it is not within 
six months of the end of its normal life. If, nine months 
later, the Bill is rejected again, the Legislative Council is 
dissolved, but only if one month has passed since the 
rejection or amendment was offered, and it is nine months 
after a normal election has occurred. If the Legislative 
Council rejects the Bill for a third time, the Governor can 
call a joint sitting of parliament. So long as there is an 
absolute majority, the Bill may gain Royal Assent. In South 
Australia, if the Legislative Council rejects the Bill, or offeis 
an unacceptable amendment, the House of Assembly is 
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dissolved. If the Legislative Council does this for a second 
time, the Governor can either dissolve both houses, or call 
two extra writs for each council division, thereby creating 
thirty vacancies, rather than the normal twenty. As there is 
no provision for a joint sitting, a majority in the Legislative 
Council is needed to pass the Bill. At the Commonwealth 
level, there is provision for a double dissolution, so long as 
it is not within six months of the end of the House of 
Representative's normal life. If the Senate again offers an 
unacceptable amendment, or rejects the Bill, the Governor-
General may call a joint sitting, and so long as an absolute 
majority is gained, the Bill may gain Royal Assent. In 
Western Australia, as in Tasmania, there is no procedure, 
however the Council may be dissolved. 6 i 
In an election held under these circumstances, the two 
most likely topics had to be the right of the Legislative 
Council to send the government to the people without going 
itself, and the character of the Premier. The first of these 
was covered in the policy of Cosgrove. In his election 
speech, Cosgrove spent the first five pages either extolling 
the virtues of his own government, or attacking the actions 
of the Legislative Council. In the opening paragraph, he 
argued the main issue at the election was whether the 
government should be allowed to continue to govern 
61 Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.), s.5A; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic.), ss. 
62-65; Constitution Act 1934-1980 (S.A.). ss.60-63; Constitution Acts 
Amendment Act 1889 (W.A.), s.46; Commonwealth of Australia Act 
1901, ss.53-56; Royal Commission into the Constitution Act 1934 
Tasmania, pp 174-176. 
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Tasmania, or the Legislative Council should be allowed 
adopt these powers for themselves. 62 
A number of reasons have been suggested why the 
government was returned. Richard Davis, quoting Cyril 
Pearl, has suggested the Australian electorate is not 
repelled by politicians connected with financial scandals. 63 
Peter Hay has suggested the Liberal Party criterion of 
honest government was insufficient to change the voting 
habits of a large number of people 64 , an opinion echoed by 
the Mercury. 65 All three of these are correct, in as far as 
there is the interconnected theme of guilt. The people of 
Tasmania had been given the option of electing a new 
government into power. The fact they did not suggests an 
acceptance of the outcome of the trial. 
The more likely reason for the return of the Cosgrove 
government was the electoral system. The Hare-Clark 
system of proportional representation, allowed the 
government to gain less than half of the vote, yet retain 
office. In 1948, Labor polled 49.38 per cent of the total 
vote, whereas the Liberals managed 37.84 per cent, an 
increase of 3.59 per cent from their efforts in 1946. 
Translating this into seats, it meant the government lost 
one member in Bass, finishing with fifteen seats statewide, 
whilst the opposition retained the same number as they 
62 Policy Speech of the Premier of Tasmania 1948,  p.1. 
63 R. Davis, Eig,hty years Labor (Hobart, 1983), P.  47. 
64 P.R. Hay, 'Problems in the analysis of political corruption', 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Tasmania, 1976, pp. 196-197. 
65 M, 23 August 1948; quoted in Hay, p.198. 
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possessed in the last parliament. 66 The Hare-Clark system 
did allow for the increase in the number of independent 
members in the legislature, with the inclusion of a new 
member, Bill Wedd, formerly a Member of the Legislative 
Counci1. 67 
The outcome of the election was a return of the Cosgrove 
Government, but at a cost. The fourth Cosgrove Government 
came about due to the good will of three independents, the 
largest number to sit in the house until the election of the 
Field Labor Government in 1989. 
During the nine month period of November 1947-August 
1948, Robert Cosgrove survived a Royal Commission, the 
first Premier of Tasmania to be so investigated; was found 
not guilty in a trial; and managed to lead his party into an 
election that was not only close, but was also called early by 
the Legislative Council, not allowing a Supply Bill through 
its chamber. At the 31 August election, the people of 
Tasmania were offered the choice of picking a new leader 
for Tasmania. But they did not. This may be put down to a 
willingness to keep with a familiar figure, no matter what 
his critics had said. 
66 They picked up one of Labor's seats in Bass, but lost one in Denison 
to Wedd. 
67 Scott Bennett, 'Labor under attack, 1947-1948, THRAPP, Vol. 33, 
No. 2. 1986. pp.78-79. 
CONCLUSION 
"Unless attending in an official capacity, the 
Premier goes to football matches and other sporting 
events Just as one of the crowd. He usually chats to 
the men nearest him. Only by keeping in touch 
with the people can a leader know what the people 
are thinking and how they are expressing 
themselves." 
John Reynolds, 'Premiers and political leaders' in 
A century of responsible government 1856-1956, p. 238. 
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The first nine years of the premiership of Robert Cosgrove saw 
the further strengthening of the Labor party in government, 
two members of the original cabinet investigated by Royal 
Commissions, the premier tried, and the continued 
advancement of the HEC. It demonstrated Robert Cosgrove's 
ability to govern Tasmania under the pressure of a major 
military conflict. 
Cosgrove's work during World War II illustrated his capacity 
to govern Tasmania during a major conflict. From December 
1939 to August 1945, he successfully managed the mixture of 
war-time and civil work. For this six year period, he helped 
ensure the safety of the Tasmanian people, particularly in the 
possible scenarios of enemy attack and invasion. By 
delegating most of the responsibility of civil defence to 
successive Directors of the CDL, he was left with more time to 
carry out the remaining duties. His ability to procure for 
Tasmania munitions production work shows Cosgrove to have 
had at least some influence with the government in Canberra. 
The introduction of uniform taxation could so easily have 
been a disaster for Cosgrove. The centralisation of taxation in 
Canberra, and the government's decision not to appeal to the 
High Court, could have resulted in a significant decrease in 
the popularity of the government. By not appealling to the 
High Court, Cosgrove saved the Tasmanian tax-payers the 
expense which would have been incurred. It is hard to believe 
one more State would have made any significant difference. 
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The period 1942-48 witnessed a sizeable increase in the work 
and importance of the HEC. All but one of the areas covered 
came out with an increase over the six years covered.' 
Ranging from 23.96 per cent in gross profit, to three hundred 
and sixty-seven per cent for new consumers, the only overall 
fall, net profit, came about due to the recent removal of 
subsidised labour, and had already begun to increase in 1947- 
48. 
During the first half of Cosgrove's period as Premier, eight 
hundred and fourteen Bills were introduced into the House of 
Assembly, of which five hundred and fifty-three gained Royal 
Assent, and four hundred and seventeen passed through the 
Legislative Council without amendment. 2 A study of the 
passage of legislation through the parliament illustrates an 
overall trend in the passage of Bills. With the exception of a 
slight dip of 0.3 per cent in 1941, the rate showed a continual 
increase until 1945, after which there was a decrease. The 
increase takes place throughout the duration of the war, and 
once that is over, there was less of a feeling of urgency. The 
decrease in passage of legislation in the post-1945 period was 
due, at least in part, to the two Royal Commissions. The 
significant drop in 1948 correlates with the view of the 
Council the government ought to go to the people. 
The significant point to come out of the Bills mentioned 
within this work, which failed to be passed by the Legislative 
'see appendices 1-4. 
2see appendices 5-6 
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Council, is their connection with the Tasmanian 
Constitution. The upper house, on successive occasions, 
refused to pass these Bills., When they did, as occurred with 
the extension of the franchise to returned soldiers, it was 
only after numerous attempts to do so by the government. 
This is more remarkable since the study of the statistics 
shows a general trend towards allowing an increasing per 
centage of Bills to gain Royal Assent during the war. The 
obvious reason for the actions of the Legislative Council was 
their view on their place within the Tasmanian Parliament. 
They saw themselves as the house of review, and any attempt 
to alter the constitution was seen to be a threat to their 
authority. Their actions in 1948 can be seen to be a variation 
on this theme. As a house of review, it was their duty to 
protect the people of Tasmania from a government which was 
clearly lacking morality. 
The period covered also contained three elections for the 
House of Assembly. The 1941 election victory was clearly due, 
in part, to the memory of Ogilvie. He had died two years 
earlier, and having led the State for almost five years, it 
would be hard to believe the people of Tasmania would have 
forgotten him so quickly. The Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour on 8 December certainly did not harm the Labor 
party's chances of retaining government. By cancelling any 
further electioneering, Cosgrove was showing concern for the 
people of Hawaii, an action which illustrates his concern for 
other people. The outcome-a very comfortable victory for the 
government-clearly showed the confidence the voters had in 
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Cosgrove and the other members of the Tasmanian 
Parliamentary Labor party. 
The same cannot be said for the result of the 1946 election. 
The return of the government with a significantly reduced 
majority was due, in part, to the recent Royal Commission on 
Forestry administration. Having a former deputy leader, and 
one of Cosgrove's original cabinet colleagues, sent to the 
courts to be tried on two counts of corruption, cast doubt on 
the government as a whole. Curiously, it helped D'Alton gain 
a seat in the Legislative Council twelve months later. 
This collapse in the polls was extended two years later, when 
the Legislative Council forced the government to seek re-
election. Whilst the actions of the Legislative Council were 
technically legal, it was a case of using powers which were 
granted to them, but not expected to be used. The 1948 
Tasmanian election stands out as the one occasion when the 
upper house used such powers, thereby illustrating the 
enormity of its powers. It is the only chamber in a western 
democracy to have such powers. 
For the most part, the two Royal Commissions which 
occurred during this eight year period possessed similar 
attributes. There were only two main differences, these being 
D'Alton was interstate during the proceedings of the Forestry 
Royal Commission, and the trial at which his innocence ar 
guilt was to be proven, did not eventuate, and only due to a 
majority decision made in Victoria. 
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When the two Royal Commissions in question are looked at 
in detail, at least five major similarities are evident. The first, 
and probably the most obvious, is they dealt with money 
going to members of the cabinet. For D'Alton, this had been 
Minister for Forests, whilst Cosgrove had been primus inter 
pares. Secondly, both had been sent to stand trial, and 
neither had set foot in the witness box at their respective 
Royal Commissions. D'Alton, until recently the inaugural 
Australian High Commissioner in Wellington, was interstate; 
whilst Mr Justice Reed decided against having Cosgrove cross-
examined for his own good. Thirdly, both were subsequently 
re-elected to parliament, D'Alton to the Legislative Council, 
and Cosgrove to the House of Assembly. In both cases, there 
was an increase in popularity, although this is not as easy to 
measure in the case of D'Alton, as it is for Cosgrove. They 
both attest to the notion Australian voters do not take too 
much notice of the idea of members of parliament being seen 
to be corrupt, when they decide to whom they are to grant 
their number one vote. In the case of D'Alton, after contesting 
the seat of Gordon in 1947, his subsequent unopposed re-
elections in 1952, 1958, and 1964 were testament to the 
voters' acceptance of him, and their noncommital views on 
the outcome of the Forestry Royal Commission. Fourthly, 
both men were charged with corruption. Finally, in both 
cases, the money was allegedly paid by people employed in 
private enterprise. This is not surprising, since there is few 
other groups within society who could make such payments. 
Today, with the increasing use of lobby groups, there are more 
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possible sources, although most, if not all of these are private 
groups. 
By being tried, Cosgrove has set a precedent in Tasmania, 
presuming it was ever required. He was, and still remains the 
only Premier of Tasmania ever to be tried before a judge and 
jury. Secondly, as is mentioned earlier, being tried on 
fourteen counts of bribery, corruption, and conspiracy did not 
do Cosgrove any harm. A cynic might suggest it is a good way 
of increasing a member's popularity. Thirdly, and possibly the 
most important, it illustrated, beyond doubt, the notion no 
one is above the law. If the head of Government can be tribd, 
so can anybody else. 
In Cosgrove, the Tasmanian people had a hard working and 
accessible premier. A man of the people, he was not afraid to 
seek out their views. A product of the working class, he was 
able to gauge the feelings of the people of Tasmania. He 
showed an ability to govern this state during both war- and 
peace-time periods, particularly during the former when, after 
December 1941, there was the ever present danger of Japanese 
invasion. 
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